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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated 
78-2a-3(h) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues to be determined by the Appellate Court chiefly resolve 
around whether court overstepped its bounds when it issued a permanent 
protective order when virtually the only allegation that court should have 
considered was that Mr. Cline (Appellant) had called Julie (Appellee) and 
asked about how he could get his boys that she had been watching for the 
weekend. When she persisted in questioning Mr. Cline about what his 
intentions were, he commented "what are you afraid I am going to come and 
beat you up? Well I am not." In spite of all the numerous allegations that 
Julie made, that was the only one that should be considered by the court to 
pp9, 18,26 
pp 26 
pp 20, 27 
pp27 
determine if Mr. Cline had done anything worthy of a protective order. Such 
a position as taken by the trial court is not supported by Utah Code and as 
such becomes a Rule of Law. Other issues surrounding this case revolve 
around issues of Res Judicata as all the other claims that were made by Julie 
were previously made in other court settings, as well as Utah Code 
Annotated 78-7-19 which prohibit making repeated requests for orders 
involving the same incidences. 
There are some Constitutional issues surrounding the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional issues resolve around due 
Process violations in that Mr. Cline was incarcerated and requested use of 
law books from the county jail and was denied his request to properly 
prepare for the hearing, even though he had made it clear in his request that 
he was representing him self. (See Exhibit Page # 39). A Federal Court has 
already decided an issue similar to this.1 The other constitutional issues 
revolve around due process for the claim of denial of rights to equal 
protection under the laws due to Gender Discrimination by Utah Trial 
Courts. There are also due process issues surrounding the proper use of 
mandated forms, the requirement that any petition for protective order be 
Milton v, Morris 767 F.2d 1443 (1985) 
£ 
verified and the mandated requirement that Petitioner inform court of other 
pending actions. 
DETERMINATIVE ISSUES 
a. Issue Number One: First Issue to be determined by the 
Court is whether a Petition for Ex Parte Protective Order that is 
not verified as required by UCA 30-6-4(4), can be the basis for 
a protective order. This should be reviewed by the court as a 
correction of error giving no deference to the trial courts 
conclusions. 
b. Issue Number Two: Whether Trial court errorfd in signing 
an ex party protective order in which the court approved form 
mandated by statute in UCA 30-6-4 was not filled out properly. 
One of the purposes of the form is to ensure that parties 
requesting a protective order fulfill the obligation mandated by 
UCA 30-6-4.1 to inform the court of other pending actions 
including any previous protective orders, juvenal court actions 
and divorces. Mr. Cline was denied due process rights and 
severely prejudiced in his defense because if Julie had followed 
the law and disclosed previous protective orders, then almost all 
7 
of the incidences that she put in there would not have gotten 
past the court clerk who reviews each petition to make sure that 
those issues previously requested are not brought up again. 
This should be reviewed as a Correction of Error with no 
deference being given to the trial courts legal conclusions. 
c. Issue Number Three: Whether the trial court was in error 
when it allowed evidence to be admitted which had been 
previously litigated and or orders requested on the same 
incidents before. This is in violation of UCA 78-7-19. It is also 
goes against previous rulings of Utah Court of Appeals and or 
The Utah Supreme Court in regards to the legal principle of Res 
Judicata . This should be reviewed as a Correction of Error 
with no deference being given to the trial courts legal 
conclusions. 
d. Issue Number Four: Whether Trial Court errored when it 
issued a protective order in which there was no evidence 
submitted that would qualify as Abuse, mandated by State 
Code. UCA 30-6-1 provides the definition of Abuse for a 
2
 Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. 758 P.2d 451 (UT 
APP. 1988) 
3
 Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc. 669 P.2d 875 (UT 1983) 
8 
protective order. Within that definition the statute mandated 
"Intentionally or Knowingly" causing a cohabitant reasonable 
fear of imminent physical harm. It also describes Domestic 
Violence as the same as UCA 77-36-1. That statute involves 
"any criminal Offense...". In spite of all Julies accusations, 
not one of them has ever reached the point of "Criminal" 
charges therefore none of her accusations should be considered 
as the basis of cohabitant abuse as defined by statute. Mr. Cline 
is not waving his right to argue that many of them didn't 
happen at all or her version was so distorted that it didn't even 
approach the standard to truth. This is also a statutory 
interpretation and should be reviewed for correctness, not 
giving any deference to the trial courts legal conclusions, 
e. Issue Number Five: Whether Mr. Clines constitutional 
rights guaranteeing equal protection under the laws and 
complete absence of discrimination on the basis of gender have 
been violated. In the two years that Mr. Cline and Julie have 
been involved in the divorce process, she has filed three 
protective orders. Court in this case concluded that "you can 
get a protective order based upon one shout for example".4 Yet 
Mr. Cline has filed two different protective orders and the first 
one involved Julie physically scratching the arm of her, at the 
time, 14 year old boy while she was holding his arm behind his 
back to make him do the dishes. When he refused, she dug 
three fingers into his arm and scratched all the way the full 
length of his foreann. The middle finger left a scar that is about 
six inches long. About a year later her thirteen year old son 
who has some learning disabilities was swearing at her so she 
wrapped his arms behind his back and tied him up with Duck 
Tape. When he started after that to kick at her she got a 
younger brother to hold him down while she wrapped his legs 
in tape. When he swore at her she stuck a sock in his mouth 
and then put duck tape across his mouth. It is clear that in Utah 
Trial Courts a women can come in and say "my husband yelled 
in my face" and get a protective order, but if a man comes in 
with events that clearly meet the definition of abuse, by statute, 
that protective orders will still not be issued. This is in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and should be reviewed 
4
 Second Transcript, PP 6, Line 18-20. Exhibit pp 54 
m 
for civil rights violations in accordance with Federal Law. This 
is a statutory interpretation and should be reviewed for 
correctness regardless of the trial courts legal conclusions, 
f. ISSUE NUMBER SIX: Whether court was in error when it 
failed to dismiss Counsel for Petitioner, Steve Wall, from the 
proceedings for having a conflict of interest. This motion had 
already been herd in Divorce Court involving all the same 
parties as well as Judge Hilder. Several days after this hearing 
an evidentiary hearing was held by Judge Hilder on the 
disqualification issues and disqualification was denied. 
Subsequent to that an Extraordinary Writ was filed in this court 
Case # 20040130 - CA. The writ was denied on the basis that 
Mr. Cline needed to find a good reason that the disqualification 
couldn't be taken care of in an ordinary appeal. Mr. Cline will 
include a copy of the petition for extoradinary writ, as an 
appendix to this appeal. The issue to be reviewed are three 
fold. Judge Hilder concluded that "contact had been made and 
information shared", but stated that an attorney client 
relationship wasn't established. Mr. Cline argues that court 
erred in that numerous Federal and State Court of Appeals, 
opinions have shown that an implied client relationship 
automatically occurs when a party shares information with an 
attorney that he reasonably believes is acting as his attorney.5 
Court also errored because it didn't use the "High Standard" of 
refuting the evidence against disqualification and resolving any 
doubt in favor of Disqualification.6 Court also errored as Rule 
4.3 states that an attorney shouldn't even talk with an un-
represented person about a case unless it is to tell them to seek 
council. It is clear that Mr. Wall should have been dismissed 
from this as well as the divorce case, (see copy of Extraordinary 
Writ, included as exhibit for all of arguments.) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Although the specific case being appealed from originated with 
the filing of an Ex Party protective order by Petitioner, Julie Cline 
Camp, on November 20, 2003, the issues actually began on or about 
March 1, 2002, with her initial protective order filed on that day. Case 
# 024901277 CA On or about March 4, 2002, Earl Cline, Appellant, 
5
 Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880F. Supp 1847 
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1493 
6
 LaSalle Nat'l Bank 703 F.2d 257 
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filed a different protective order against Julie (Appellee), in which he 
alleges all sorts of physical abuse by Julie against the children. Case # 
024901388 CA. A hearing was held on March 21, 2002 and 
protective orders were stipulated to be dismissed. Julie was given till 
April 11, 2002 to file for divorce and then protective order was to be 
dismissed. Of note, the one child that Julie had alleged that Earl had 
abused was oldest son Robert. Robert had been placed under 
Jurisdiction of the Juvenal Court several months earlier. During the 
three weeks that Robert was under custody of his mother, Julie had 
him committed to Juvenal Detention because she and he were fighting 
so badly. On March 21, 2002 in the afternoon Julie and Earl met at 
Third district Juvenal court in front The Honorable Judge Johansson, 
to decide what to do with Robert. At the hearing it was decided by 
agreement with Julie and order of the Juvenal Court that Robert 
should live with his Father (Appellant). 
On April 11, 2002 Julie filed for divorce and the protective 
order was dismissed. 
On or about April 23, 2002 Julie filed for another protective 
order. In this one she asked that she have her previously dismissed 
protective order re-instated. Case # 024902553. She used incident at 
Genesis in which she tried to show Mr. Cline as being physically 
violent. She also accused him of stalking her old boy friend, and of 
trying to break into her home. There were several other allegations. 
The protective order was denied, but she was still given a hearing on 
or about May 11, 2002 to try and convince a judge that she needed a 
protective order. The hearing was held in Commissioner Casey's 
court and he again denied the protective order. 
On November 25, 2002, Mr. Cline tried to file a protective 
order against Julie for her wrapping minor son Christopher's (age 13) 
arms legs and mouth in duck tape because he was miss-behaving and 
for throwing him against a wall and hurting his shoulder again when 
she was upset at him. Case # 024907368 CA. Minor son Joshua (age 
11) was also included in that as Julie had made Josh hold Chris down 
so she could tape him up. The order was denied. Not only was the 
order denied but Mr. Cline was also denied rights to due process by 
not scheduling a hearing as required by UCA 30-6-4.3 (3). This is in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution as not only was due process denied, but the entire 
protective order system as practiced by the courts in Utah is biased 
towards women. 
14 
On March 6 2003 a stocking injunction was filed by Sharon 
Packer, Julies mother, in I ; 01 nth District court, in Heber. Case # 
030500106 11 1 till 1 2 iii: 1 ji 11 ictiol 1 si ic listed issues related to Gei lesis, 
allegations o f breaking into Ju l ies home -* n >n of : u i k u K >f 
Julies old boy friend, Al legat ions o f child abuse against Robert, Chris 
and Josh by Mr. Cline. Al legat ion o f coming into Julies home in 
January o f 2 0 0 3 in order to drop of f the s leeping children w h e n Julie 
ia; i a to come get them at the curbside as court ordered, Al legat ion 
I ii il: :) Ji 1L1.es 1 101 1 le ai id al legedly stolei 1 a cai 
(u wab nib written pen: 1 lission I \\legation that Mr. 
Cline is harassing the Packers by fighting them in court when they 
sued him for a mural Mi, Cline and Julie had painted, and many other 
allegations, many of which have now found themselves included in 
this latest November 20, 2003 ex party application for protective order 
i> A/ I lie! 1 is 1 io\ v 1:1 le si lbject oi "this appeal. 
Again in a September 23, 2003 hearii lg 01 11\ lotioi 1 to SI 10w 
Cause, Mr. Cline had to defend himself against these very same 
allegations. At the end of the hearing Julie asked the court to re-issue 
her protective order and the motion was denied. That Judge was the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder, the same Judge that issued the current 
protective order. 
In October 17, 2003 a trial was held in Third District Juvenal 
Court, presided over by the Honorable Judge Arthur G. Christean. At 
the trial the allegations that Mr. Cline had abused his children were 
heard and dismissed completely. Case # 425964. Again they came up 
on this protective order and Julie was there, testified and knew that 
they were dismissed. She even tried to establish somehow that her 
voluntary decision to testify against Mr. Cline was harassment on his 
part. She has even in her petition for protective order tried to state 
that Mr. Cline filing a motion for reconsideration of contempt issues 
based upon rule 59 and 60 of Rules of Civil procedure is harassment 
of her and her family. 
On or about November 20, 2003, Julie filed an ex party 
protective Order. The order was assigned to Judge Anthony B. Quin, 
but he did not sign it. He turned it over to Judge Hilder, the Judge 
presiding over the current divorce. On November 25, 2003, Mr. Cline 
had a review hearing in Judge Hilder's court on Contempt and was 
sentenced to the remaining 26 days in Jail. The hearing was 
scheduled and Mr. Cline had to be transported from Salt Lake County 
16 
Metro to attend the Protective order heating. 11c contacted his h o l L i 
iiini Mum .iml iislM'd lliciii lu provide tluiiiinenls lot roml lutlge 
I lildei refi ised to allow 1 ill i 11 : i lse thei i i '"1 liile in Salt Lake County 
Metro. Earl informed the Jail staff that he was defending himself pro 
se in court and needed various volumes of Utah Code. The request 
was denied. 
n
" December . * < .. Hearing was held in the coin" y -M 
I IUIIOI < - . v\ ai lei it protect M 
grand December 17, 2003 and an appeal 
was filed by Appellant on December 19, 2003. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Cline argues that numerous blatant errors were made by Julie in 
filling out the forms, including failing to lia\c tin.' IViidun lor piotecliv i" 
oi dei "verified", in itil aftei tl le oi dei was sigi led by tl le Ii ldge Ii ilie also 
failed to fill out the forms that required that she continue to keep court 
informed as to other proceedings currently pending. These two errors alone 
have caused enough prejudious to have the entire case dismissed. There is 
the issue that Council for Petitioner, Steve Wall had a conflict of interest as 
defined by Utah i <w fron » 
1 ' iegligen " * • i; ii >- Pi t-v n-aibu 
17 
issues of Civil Rights Violations and Constitutional Amendment violations 
on the part of the Trial Court. If not resolved here, Appellant will have the 
right to take this appeal to a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Federal Court. There 
are Issues of Res Judicata as well as conflict with State Statute for 
continuality bringing in the same allegations. That issue alone is enough to 
have the entire case thrown out. But even if none of these other issues didn't 
exist, the fact remains that Julie simply didn't meet the burden of 
establishing a need for a protective order based upon her allegations. She 
alleged Child Abuse, but that was previously dismissed. She alleged assault, 
but that was herd in contempt hearing and court concluded that "the court 
finds insufficient evidence of violent grabbing of an arm or anything of the 
kind". Court tried to argue that being present at Julies home during an 
alleged incident when a car that belongs to Mr. Cline was taken out of a 
garage is trespassing. Mr. Cline provided significant evidence at contempt 
hearing that he had permission to take the car, and court refused to allow 
admission of the evidence. That entire contempt order is being appealed as 
soon as court signs final order. But even if all her allegations were true 
about that incident, Standard of proof as detailed by UCA 77-36-1, is 
"criminal offense". Contempt even if the allegations were true, are civil in 
7
 Civil # 024902228 DA, ORDER ON CONTEMPT HEARING HELD 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003. pp. 5 Paragraph 11 
18 
nature and standard of proof is very different than for a Criminal Off en.se 
Finally Court stated that ""you can get a protective oulci based upon one 
shout lor e\,iiiipk "' 1 U teal *|iiesiion lh.it e^  ei", oiii' (i ho re\ lews this 
tmnscripl should ask themselves is, do you want the court to be able to take 
your home, family, property and ability to see your children simply for the 
fact that you shouted at your wife (or husband) even just once? The 
argument is completely ludicrous and flies in the face of any Constitutional 
rights to property, family associations, as well as riglr ,; n c, ^ 4iw * 
other rights as guj:-J .M . 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Cline has shown that a number of the statues mandating what the 
courts are to do prior to taking a persons rights guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution including; Property Rights, Family Associations, even 
possible imprisonment, were not followed it i tl lis c: ase. 1 1 :ie petitioi i for 
protective CM dei was ;t lot i lotat ized \ n itil aftei the Ii icige signed the order. 
Ji ilie failed tc it ICII ide any of the numerous cases in her Petition as required 
by statute. There are Five Protective Order cases between these two parties. 
There is a Divorce. There is a Juvenal Court Case which would leave any 
orders from District Court regarding oldest son Robert invalid us . S-
8
 Second Transcript, PP 6, Line 18-20. 
1 O 
3a-104 states that Juvenal Court has "original and exclusive jurisdiction" 
over any minor who has violated any federal, state, or local law. Therefore 
any order made by District Court regarding Robert after he came under 
Juvenal Court Jurisdiction in January of 2002, would be void, as District 
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over Robert.9 "A commitment by a 
justice of the peace for a crime not committed in his county is void for want 
of jurisdiction and the party held hereunder is deprived of his liberty without 
due process". 10 Even in the first protective order fled by Julie, she illegally 
obtained control over Robert and started a chain reaction that has nearly 
destroyed Roberts life. 
There is a stalking injunction from Fourth District Court in Heber. In 
each and every one of these cases, the same events and allegations are 
repeated over and over. If Julie doesn't get the Judge to issue the order, she 
changes the wording a little, makes up new allegations and tries again. The 
result is an application for protective order in which she has now made over 
forty allegations against Mr. Cline. Almost all of them had previously been 
dismissed, in most cases, several times. Mr. Cline has numerous times 
refuted each and every one of the allegations. If Mr. Cline tried to include 
all the documents for each and every one of the trials and or hearings, this 
9
 Jensen v. Sew 134 P.2d 1081 
10
 In re Kelly Federal Reporter, Volume 46, PP. 653 
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bi ief would be ovei 400 pages long. ' 1 1 lis is ridicules and no one should 
hav e to be si lbjected to tl lis She 1: lad i nade tl le allegatioi I o^ • ei ai id oi(. 'ei 
again that Mr. Cline is Harassing her. Although the statute defines 
harassment, UCA 76-5-106 states that harassment has to include "violent 
felony" and Mr. Cline denies in any way that he has threatened a violent 
felony against her. By her own definition, she is harassing Mr, Cline with 
her i epeated acquisitions. Coi ii: t si 101 ild take a strong stand against this type 
of bel i.a;v ioi ai id disi i liss tl lis pi otective ordei oi i those gi oui ids aloi le 
There is the issue of Discrimination and failing to grant Mr. Cline 
equal protection under the laws as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Article VI of the Constitution of the United States states in part that "This 
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof,, Shall hi I l l i i supreme law of the land: and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby "" \ll courts now kivi ,i ii 
legal obligation to not see color or race or handicap or even gender when 
decisions are made. In spite of that a women can get a protective order in 
Utah just because her husband yells at her. Yet Mr. Cline has tried several 
times un-successfully to get a protective order for his children and him when 
Ji llies coi idi ict v 'as ii I cleai a Dlatioi I of State Code 1 1 lis is cleat ly 
disci iminatoi } ' I i y arguii ig discrii i lii lation agaii ist tl le \ ery In ldge tl: lat is 
21 
discriminating against you. Mr. Cline filed a motion for Recrusal of Judge 
Hilder, based upon the concept of discrimination and it was denied by the 
court. Yet it is obvious that it goes on. The United States Supreme Court 
concluded, "To withstand scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause, 
Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."11 Court 
should dismiss this protective order on the basis of discrimination alone. 
In addition specific rights to see his children were taken away as a 
result of this protective order. Given that there were no specific allegations 
that Mr. Cline had done anything against the children, Trial Court has no 
right to take away rights to see the children even if there turn's out to be 
some legitimate state interest in protecting the mother. The United States 
Supreme Court has ruled that "The extent to which procedural due process 
must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may 
be condemned to suffer grievous loss.'... and depends upon whether the 
recipients interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governments interest 
in summary adjudication." There may be legitimate times when a person 
needs protection from an abusive spouse, but in this case every single issue 
except for the incident in which Mr. Cline called Julie and asked if she was 
11
 Orr v. Orr 440 U.S. 268 
12
 Goldberg v. Kelly 379 U.S. 254 (1979) 
22 
afraid he was going to beat her up, had already been heai judge Hi I dor. 
In September 22,. contempt hearing amotion w .r miule Ii« lnlie loi i 
new protcctis i.1 order JUJ \\:r denied hv Judj'e I I'Uei Win then does Court 
need lo lake siiiniflainl rights away from Mr. Cline on an Ex Party order. 
And why did Court need to modify visitation with the children at all. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled "the fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does no I cvapoi alt 
simply because the^ lost 
<*hild to the state. A parental rights 
termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty 
interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it 
• --> 
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." 
Due Process rights have been violated when Attorney Steve Wall is 
allowed to continue lo iepiesei11 lnlio m ihp, or 'iiv other east" involving 
Appellant \\ ith the ver\ llrsl document filed in the divorce case, Appellant 
requested the dismissal of Steve Wall. Due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Mr. Clines then attorney, for some reason failed to properly finish 
having Steve dismissed. At a later hearing when Mi l line was then 
13
 Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 
i i . 
defending himself Pro Se, he brought up again the issue of dismissal of 
Steve. Court encouraged Mr. Cline to file a formal motion requesting such. 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cline filed the formal motion and a hearing was held. 
One of the reasons it was denied was because of the short length of time till 
the trial was finished. But the Court made several errors in not dismissing 
Steve. One of them was that Court concluded that contact was made and 
information was shared, but that it didn't constitute an attorney client 
relationship. Numerous Federal Court of Appeals decisions have ruled that 
an Attorney Client Relationship occurs automatically any time one party 
shares information with the Attorney in which he believes that the Attorney 
is acting as his Attorney.14 Mr. Cline also argues that Court errored in that 
it used a high standard of proof on the part of Mr. Cline for having Steve 
dismissed. Federal Appellate Courts have ruled that the standard for an 
Attorney when refuting evidence of Conflict of Interest is Clear and 
Convincing Evidence on the part of the Attorney. It also states that Court 
should resolve any doubt with an order of disqualification.15 Even if court 
had reason in the divorce case to allow Steve to continue to represent Julie 
because of the length of time left till trial, Court could have very easily 
14
 Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880F. Supp 1847 
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1493 
15
 LaSalle Nat'l Bank 703 F.2d 257 
O/ l 
dismissed Steve from this case. Mr. Cline again argues that this alone 
should be enough to get the protective order dismissed. 
Finally Appellant argues 111; 11 (Ins pioh eli\ e ohlei ^hutiU Ivr dismissed 
because it JUSI phiie e-jiui mvded .iml ,Inline has not provided any evidence of 
;ii»\ issues (Iiit w nuld allow a protective order to issue as dictated by statute. 
Court concluded that just a shout at your spouse could be the basis for a 
protective order issuance. No basis for that opinion can be found in any 
state statute. Utah Code defines abuse as ""Abuse" means intentionally or 
knowingly causing or attempting to can* . * 
intentional . .*< ; ^ nable fear of Imminent 
physica' • • ' a concluded that "Statutory enactment are 
to he construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful".17 
"Court is compelled to give statutorily language meaning, and to assume that 
each and every term in statute was used advisedly unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable."18 "Courl will ..noid inlerprchilioii 
which renders portion ol ,»i eoid\ nt itaiuiles SU|HTI1IH)US or inoperative. 
Excepi Ioi i lie :1111"gatiori that Mr. Cline grabbed her and shook her in the 
fiout yard, which was already ruled upon by Judge Hilder and found to be 
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 UCA 30-6-1(1) 
7Platts v. Parents Helping Parents 947 P.2d. 658 
18
 IBID 
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without merit, there was no allegation of causing cohabitant physical harm. 
The question then is whether a phone call from Mr. Cline in which he stated, 
" what are you afraid I am going to come and beat you up?, well I am not", 
would put a reasonable person in "fear of imminent physical harm?" Even if 
the statement was taken without the second part, the statement was a 
question, not a threat to do something. It is also not done "intentionally to 
cause fear". Even if she was afraid after the phone call, was there anything 
about the statement that suggested that "imminent" physical danger was 
present? Mr. Cline was over ten miles away and so nothing about that 
would display imminent danger. 
Utah Code defines domestic violence as the same as UCA 77-36-1. 
The second paragraph of UCA 77-36-1 defines domestic violence as any 
"criminal" offence. It also describes a number of other crimes that could be 
construed to be Domestic Violence. Assault is listed there. UCA 76-5-102 
describes assault as "a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence,". Again even if the incidents she has outlined were considered 
threats, which they were not, it must be followed by "immediate" show of 
force. Since Mr. Cline was ten miles away, it would be very difficult to 
establish the requirement that it be immediate. Harassment as defined by 
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UCA 76-5-106 does not fit in any of the allegations that she has made. 
Stalking as defined by UCA 76-5-106.5 Also does not fit into the legal 
definition of what she has described. In short, Julie has made a whole bunch 
of accusations that don't come close to meeting the definition of abuse or 
domestic violence as required by statute. 
For all these reasons the Protective Order should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Mr. Cline has shown several reasons for the protective 
order to have been dismissed. Each and every one of the reasons standing 
alone should be enough for the court to dismiss it. When you look at it in 
light of all the inaccuracies and puffing, the intentional leaving out other 
court issues so that she could get the protective order submitted the way it 
was, it is clear that this order has no business being issued. It should be 
overturned and dismissed. In addition Court should issue an order that Steve 
Wall should dismiss himself from representing any issue between Julie and 
Mr. Cline because of an conflict of interest. 
Respectfully Submitted this f-^Day of June, 2004 
S 
Appellant (Pro Se) 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was hand delivered this,/ day of June, 2004 to: 
Steve Wall 
Wall and Wall 
4460 S Highland Dr. Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
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78-7-19. Repeated application for orders forbidden. 
(1) If an application for an order, made to a judge of a court in which the action or 
proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part or is granted conditionally, a 
subsequent application for the same order may not be made to any other judge, except of 
a higher court. 
(2) This section does not apply to motions refused for any informality in the papers or 
proceedings necessary to obtain the order, or to motions refused with liberty to renew 
them. 
(3) A notice of appeal for a trial de novo is not a subsequent application for the same 
order. 
30-6-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting to cause a 
cohabitant physical harm or intentionally or knowingly placing a cohabitant in reasonable 
fear of imminent physical harm. 
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1 or a person 
who is 16 years of age or older who: 
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party; 
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party; 
(c) is related by blood or marriage to the other party; 
(d) has one or more children in common with the other party; 
(e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child; or 
(f) resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does not include: 
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent to a minor; or 
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive, step, or foster siblings who are under 18 
years of age. 
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk. 
(5) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is defined in Section 77-36-1. 
(6) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued without notice to the defendant 
in accordance with this chapter. 
(7) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order issued by another state, 
territory, or possession of the United States, tribal lands of the United States, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia which shall be given full 
faith and credit in Utah, if the protective order is similar to a protective order issued in 
compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, and includes the following requirements: 
(a) the requirements of due process were met by the issuing court, including subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction; 
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice; and 
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hearing regarding the protective order. 
(8) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement agency" means any public agency 
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having general police power and charged with making arrests in connection with 
enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances of this state or any political 
subdivision. 
(9) "Peace officer" means those persons specified in Title 53, Chapter 13, Peace 
Officer Classifications. 
(10) "Protective order" means an order issued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a 
hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner and respondent have been given notice in 
accordance with this chapter. 
30-6-4. Forms for petitions and protective orders — Assistance. 
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal assistance to 
persons seeking to proceed under this chapter. 
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for 
petitions and orders for protection in accordance with the provisions of this chapter on or 
before September 1, 1995. That office shall provide the forms to the clerk of each court 
authorized to issue protective orders. The forms shall include: 
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective order that knowing 
falsification of any statement or information provided for the purpose of obtaining a 
protective order may subject the petitioner to felony prosecution; 
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of which is a 
criminal offense, and a separate portion for those provisions, the violation of which is a 
civil violation, as provided in Subsection 30-6-4.2(5); 
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of any criminal 
provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stating violation of 
or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings; 
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate identification 
of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license number, date of birth, 
address, telephone number, and physical description; 
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for the civil 
provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides in 
writing the reason for the requested extension of the length of time beyond 150 days; 
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is included in an ex 
parte protective order or a protective order, as part of either the criminal or the civil 
portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to the principal of the 
school where the child attends; and 
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails to return custody of 
a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the petitioner may obtain 
from the court a writ of assistance. 
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by an 
attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide: 
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1); 
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection including, but not 
limited to, forms for service; 
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing the petition, in accordance 
with Subsection (l)(a). A court clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency, or 
person to provide that service, but the court clerk's office is responsible to see that the 
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service is provided; 
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process; 
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner in an action 
brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of those organizations; 
and 
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a jailed or imprisoned 
respondent to the protective order hearing, including an explanation of the use of 
transportation order forms when necessary. 
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforcement 
agency for: 
(a) filing a petition under this chapter; 
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order; 
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service or delivery 
to law enforcement officials; or 
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective order. 
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified. 
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1). 
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall include the 
following language: 
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the 
District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories." 
(Emphasis added) 
30-6-4.1. Continuing duty to inform court of other proceedings — Effect of other 
proceedings. 
(1) At any hearing in a proceeding to obtain an order for protection, each party has a 
continuing duty to inform the court of each proceeding for an order for protection, any 
civil litigation, each proceeding in juvenile court, and each criminal case involving either 
party, including the case name, the file number, and the county and state of the 
proceeding, if that information is known by the party. 
(2) (a) An order for protection issued pursuant to this chapter is in addition to and not 
in lieu of any other available civil or criminal proceeding. 
(b) A petitioner is not barred from seeking a protective order because of other pending 
proceedings. 
(c) A court may not delay granting relief under this chapter because of the existence of 
a pending civil action between the parties. 
(3) A petitioner may omit his or her address from all documents filed with the court 
under this chapter, but shall separately provide the court with a mailing address that is not 
to be made part of the public record, but that may be provided to a peace officer or entity 
for service of process. 
30-6-15. Dismissal of protective order when divorce is final. 
When a protective order exists and a divorce proceeding is pending between the same 
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parties named in the protective order, the protective order shall be dismissed when the 
court issues a decree of divorce for the parties if the petitioner in the protective order 
action is present or has been given notice in both the divorce and protective order action 
of the hearing, and the court specifically finds that the order need not continue. If the 
court dismisses the protective order, the court shall immediately issue an order of 
dismissal to be filed in the protective order action and transmit a copy of the order of 
dismissal to the statewide domestic violence network as described in Section 30-6-8. 
30-6-4.3. Hearings on ex parte orders. 
(1) (a) When a court issues an ex parte protective order the court shall set a date for a 
hearing on the petition within 20 days after the ex parte order is issued. 
(b) If at that hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective 
order shall expire, unless it is otherwise extended by the court. 
(c) If at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order 
remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed. 
(d) A protective order issued after notice and a hearing is effective until further order 
of the court. 
(e) If the hearing on the petition is heard by a commissioner, either the petitioner or 
respondent may file an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended order 
and the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection. 
(2) Upon a hearing under this section, the court may grant any of the relief described 
in Section 30-6-4.2. 
(3) When a court denies a petition for an ex parte protective order or a petition to 
modify an order for protection ex parte, the court shall set the matter for hearing upon 
notice to the respondent. 
(4) A respondent who has been served with an ex parte protective order may seek to 
vacate the ex parte protective order prior to the hearing scheduled pursuant to Subsection 
(l)(a) by filing a verified motion to vacate. The respondent's verified motion to vacate 
and a notice of hearing on that motion shall be personally served on the petitioner at least 
two days prior to the hearing on the motion to vacate. 
77-36-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in Section 30-6-1. 
(2) "Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or physical 
harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to 
commit a criminal offense involving violence or physical harm, when committed by one 
cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence" also means commission or attempt to 
commit, any of the following offenses by one cohabitant against another: 
(a) aggravated assault, as described in Section 76-5-103; 
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102; 
(c) criminal homicide, as described in Section 76-5-201; 
(d) harassment, as described in Section 76-5-106; 
(e) telephone harassment, as described in Section 76-9-201; 
(f) kidnaping, child kidnaping, or aggravated kidnaping, as described in Sections 76-5-
301, 76-5-301.1, and 76-5-302; 
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(g) mayhem, as described in Section 76-5-105; 
(h) sexual offenses, as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Title 76, Chapter 
5a; 
(i) stalking, as described in Section 76-5-106.5; 
(j) unlawful detention, as described in Section 76-5-304; 
(k) violation of a protective order or ex parte protective order, as described in Section 
76-5-108; 
(1) any offense against property described in Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, 2, or 3; 
(m) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, as described in Section 76-
10-507; 
(n) discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in the direction of any 
person, building, or vehicle, as described in Section 76-10-508; 
(0) disorderly conduct, as defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction of disorderly 
conduct is the result of a plea agreement in which the defendant was originally charged 
with any of the domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this Subsection (2). 
Conviction of disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense, in the manner described 
in this Subsection (2)(o), does not constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 921, and is exempt from the provisions of the federal Firearms 
Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq.; or 
(p) child abuse as described in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(3) "Victim" means a cohabitant who has been subjected to domestic violence. 
76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 
76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the 
physical condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not a 
serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which 
seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious 
emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to the child, 
including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused by blows, 
shaking, or causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a hot 
object upon the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, 
either at the same time or on different occasions; 
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(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to 
function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation is 
successful following the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that 
jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or 
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a 
child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody 
of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of 
an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means 
alone through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and 
practices of an established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal 
guardian is a member or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have 
committed an offense under this section. 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
76-5-106. Harassment. 
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass another, he 
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communicates a written or recorded threat to commit any violent felony. 
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Stalking — Injunction — Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity 
to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person 
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household within 
the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific 
person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer 
emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate 
family. 
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a 
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or 
intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued 
pursuant to this section. 
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 
3a, Stalking Injunctions. 
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar 
to the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in 
another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim of 
the stalking or a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the 
previous felony offense; or 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection 
(7). 
(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime of 
stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of 
offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under 
Subsection (5); or 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of 
crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be 
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony 
offenses. 
(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a 
period of time shall operate as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction 
limiting the contact of the defendant and the victim. 
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued without a hearing unless 
the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance. The court 
shall give the defendant notice of his right to request a hearing. 
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the time of the verdict, 
finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea 
in abeyance unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause. 
(ii) If the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea of no contest, 
or acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the 
judgment and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in 
abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district court as an application and request for 
hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief: 
(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or 
place of employment of the victim and requiring the defendant to stay away from the 
victim and members of the victim's immediate family or household and to stay away 
from any specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the 
victim; and 
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with the victim, including 
an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any 
communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or 
telephone contact with the victim, the victim's employers, employees, fellow workers, or 
others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the 
victim. 
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved upon application of the 
victim to the court which granted the order. 
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section 
shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system. 
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section shall be 
effective statewide. 
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(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section shall constitute an offense 
of stalking. Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a 
criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the filing of a criminal information for 
stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking 
injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or permanent 
criminal stalking injunction. 
U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or properly, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the 
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on December 12, 2003) 
THE COURT: Primarily, Mr. Cline, I understand that 
you have family who have brought you some documents and have 
real issues about you getting you those documents, and that is 
a significant security concern. 
A few years ago it would have been a non-issue. 
Unfortunately it's become an issue because in these wonderful 
modern times we've learned that security is just going to 
rise in ways that we cannot conceive with the naked eye, for 
example, such as powders or even Anthrax. It's a true issue, 
and one I cannot ignore. 
But let's talk about the scope of what we're doing 
today. My understanding is, number one, we address the status 
of the ex parte protective order today, which should continue 
in force. That one ended a couple of weeks ago, and today is 
zhe rearing set to determine if a permanent or relatively 
permanent order should enter or whether it should be dismissed 
On that issue, Mr. Cline, there are particular 
documents you were seeking. A lot of this is stuff that has 
been addressed to the Court in many different ways, but in 
terms of the documents you're trying to get together, how did 
that impact the protective order portion? 
MR. CLINE: There's several reasons, your Honor. Her 
motion for protective order was made based upon the fact that 
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she deserved the protective order previously, and she's asking 
to have it reinstated. 
THE COURT: Well, it — I know it seems like that, but 
that's not the way. You can apply for one any tine, and I 
guess you can call it reinstatement. I think that really is 
just a question of words, but I reviewed it. I'm the one that 
granted it, and it wasn't based on reinstating. It was whether 
she's making sufficient aliegations of cohabitant abuse or 
violence that would support a protective order, as I look at 
it. So, I mean it wasn't so much a reinstatement, as does she 
make out a case now? 
MR. CLINE: Your Honor, the principles of res judicata 
say that you can't be charged over and over and over again, and 
the documents that I have are in protective order from Karen 1 
as subsequent protective order from --
THE COURT: I guess it was your brother. He managed to 
get — I've got every file, I know what you mean. So I have 
gone through every one of those last night. I have with this 
new one five protective order files. 
MR. CLINE: Okay, there's two of them that I filed. 
THE COURT: Yes, two that she filed. 
MR. CLINE: Two of them are that she filed. 
THE COURT: Three, "really, I guess, now. 
MR. CLINE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Yes, that's correct. I looked at every one 
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of them. 
KR, CLINE: So based on the principles of res ^udicta, 
I still need to get those documents, 
THE COURT: Res judicata, and it doesn't necessarily 
work that way* Res judicata is a very interesting doctrine, 
but it means an issue conclusively decided on the merits. It's 
binding on future proceedings. A lot of fact. Itfs not like 
double jeopardy, that's very different although it's got some 
of the same basic underpinnings of fairness. 
Res judicata is more a judicial economy doctrine in 
this state. We don't decide the same issues over and over, but 
most of these were never granted. So they were not of issue. 
The ex parte (inaudible) granted, or they were dissolved or 
they were dissolved by agreement. 
Theyr in my opinion, do not bar filing one, particular 
if Ms, Camp can make out any more recent occurrence. I think 
that's the issue on this and some of it was from a long hearing 
where we looked at issues of contempt which frankly (inaudible) 
you being in this position, and some was about stuff that 
happened in the last ccupie months, if I remerrber correctly, 
although Ms. Camp did rehash a lot of old stuff, no question. 
MR. CLINE: She has a lot of what? 
THE COURT: She rehashed a lot of old stuff, but it 
will be a couple of new things, and we really can't — we've 
got to look for that new stuff very carefully. 
-5 
MR. CLINE: Well, I — the point is I feel like I neec 
-- I need those documents in order to prepare my defense. I 
don't even feel like the actual protective order was filled out 
properly because I filled out two of these, your Honor, and in 
each and every case they ask you to specifically list any 
pending cases, and she should have listed the juvenile court 
case with Robert, She should have listed the divorce case. 
She should have listed those two projective orders that sr.e' s 
previously filed, because they go and they pull those and they 
-ell you specifically that you cannot add old stuff to a new 
protective order, and she didn't even list those on there. 
THE COURT: Well, the issue today really probably is 
mostly whether there are new things that would support issuance 
of che order, and that burden is hers to meet. 
MR. CLINE: So we can throw out all the old stuff? 
"HE COURT: Not necessarily. It depends on how it 
was thrown out or resolved, but my primary focus is on you, 
definitely. Sr. I think — Mr. Wall, what is your position 
on the — did you come prepared today to carry the burden of 
showing why a permanent order should enter? 
MR. WALL: Certainly, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That would be number one we're doing. It's 
]ust (inaudible) that we're doing otherwise. I also set this 
as a review of the custody status, whether you should se^ve the 
full 30 days or whether you should be released sooner. Did you 
come prepared to address that? 
MR. CLINE: Yes. I didn't realize that wc were goir.g 
to review the custody status, but I have a motion I filed that: 
was going to be heard today over with Commissioner Evans. 
Commissioner Evans? Yeah, it's Commissioner Evans, and when 
we were here at the — 
THE COURT: In the divorce? 
MR. CLINE: Yes, 
THE COURT: I didn't see it. What's that about? 
MR. CLINE: What? 
THE COURT: What's that for? 
MR. CLINZ: That's what the order that's a — Steve's. 
Steve's got an order sent tc my Mom and Dad and tney turned 
around and sent 1: to me in jail. There is a motion in there 
about changing temporary orders, and that's what we were set t 
be -- to be here about, your Honor* 
THE COURT: Weil, I he»ve — you have your motion to 
modify, but that's a trial issue, isn't it? 
MR. WALL: Well, your Honor, we — the Court ordered 
and che order has been submitted to you. I don't know whether 
the appropriate time has elapsed to sign that iron the last 
hearing, and that was that ail matters be consolidated --
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. WALL: — and heard by you. 
THE COURT: And that's the way it's going to be, but I 
haven't seen the order on that. 
MR. WALL: Well, I delivered -- hand delivered ic 
myself, [inaudible) I think it's in your basket. He said we'd 
hold it ten days, but I can't remember. 
THE COURT: Yeah, we have it three days mailing ana 
then the time and then we put (inaudible) and the weekends 
generally get us. So we're normally looking about 11 or 12 
cays by the cime we're done. 
MR. WALL: Well, in any event, that order is wiih the 
Court and ic -- it. consolidated ail matters, and Mr. cline has 
this motion to modify temporary orders, I filed a response to 
that. 
MR. CLINE: Which I haven't seen, your Honor. 
MR. WALL: The reason Mr. Cline hasn't received — 
THE COURT: I have seen your response, yes. 
MR. WALL: Okay, and I've got his copy here. The rule 
entitle us to deliver up to one day before the hearing. The 
jail will net accept the facts. They will not -- zhe only way 
Z can deliver this (inaudible) is to personally deliver it 
myself, and then I have to remain there while he reads it. I 
guess I can'z leave it with him. So that wasn't an acceptable 
arrangement, 
So I've got that response today to his motion, but 
ne's got that pending and I assumed we would be hearing that 
totiav. If not then I guess we could certainly move that over 
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for another day, but that would have in fact eliminate the need 
to appear before Commissioner Evans, which was scheduled for 
today, 
THE COURT: Well, I scheduled him for today. There was 
one en the 10" en the protective order, but that was stricken. 
I noted last night that although we struck it, it only showed 
up ir. the divorce case. So he didn't know that. He just 
struck for nonappearance saying his facts, but I did a minute 
entry explaining that he'd had in his facts (inaudible) today. 
So that needs to be clarified in that file, but — now 
the most — the temporary order, sir, this case has become such 
a convoluted mess that it makes no sense for a Commissioner tc 
be making recommendations on a piecemeal basis that are all 
subject to review by me. So, they're going tc be heard here. 
MR. CLINE: And I agree with that, your Honor. I think 
that's fine. 
THE COURT: And recognizing the high (inaudible) of 
this divorce and all the other issues, I will continue to do 
everything in my power to allow expedited hearings, but you 
have not seen the response to your motion for temporary 
orders — 
MR. CLINE: No, sir. 
THE COURT: I think depending or. how we determine your 
custody status today, we probably should look at rescheduling 
that in the very near future, once you've had a chance to 
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review it ar.d get the paper work that you haven't had a cnance 
to get to. 
MR. CLINEr One of the issues there is about addressing 
the disqualification of Mr. Wall. That's in that motion — 
THE COURT: Well, that should be a separate motion. If 
you've got a basis to move for that, it's got to be separate. 
MR, WALL: Well, I certainly wouldn't mind addressing 
that today, your Honor, because they keep having that addressed 
and I'n addressing — 
THE CC'JRT: I'm willing to address — I say T got. your 
response and I (inaudible), because I just saw it last night 
for the first: ^ ;mef in fact, also. In fact, it was received 
yesterday, it looks like. 
I did notice in your affidavit a response to that 
issue, and disqualification of opposing Counsel is a difficult 
thing because people are entitled to Counsel of their choice, 
you've got a fairly high burden. So I guess I'll ask you if 
you feel ready to address this today without more paperwork? 
MR. CLI.\'E: Well, your Honor, all the paperwork zhat 
have, and the evidence I have is in that mo tier, that ] !iied ar.ri 
I don't have a copy of it with me. 
THE COURT: As to the one that's in the file, if I 
could find that we could make- you a copy- What we have, we can 
give you. That's not a problem, but that's all we would 'nave, 
but I'm not sure which one it is. What date did you file it; 
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do you recall? There's a lot of paper in here and I'm not sure 
which one --
MR. WALL: (Inaudible) his motion to modify temporary 
orders. 
MR. CLINE: It was in September — 
THE CC'JRT: Yeah, (inaudible). 
MR. WALL: ; Inaudible; all of them. 
MR. CLINE: (Inaudible), 
KR. WALL: November 4*h is when the motion (inaudible). 
THE; COURT: (Inaudible). 
MR, WALL: And then he's got a memorandum attached with 
it, and I think it's paragraph 7 where he addresses --
THE COURT: The disqualification issue goes to some 
allegation that in some way you represented or counseled both 
a:: one tine. 
MR, WALL: Well, Chat's his allegation. 
THE COURT: I know. Irm asking about the allegations. 
I'm not asking you to admit or deny at this point. I know your 
position, because that's what it's about. It doesn't -- that's 
what I notice. So there's nothing else in there on that issue 
of disqualification? 
MR. CLINE: Yes, there is, your Honor. It has to do 
with not only did he counsel with me, but that he subsequently 
turned around and released all the information chat I had giver; 
to him tc my ex-mother-in-law, who subsequently then released 
- l i -
l t again to ray wifer at the time. 
THE COURT: Well and what you're saying, then, is that 
he had an attorney/cl ien: relationship with you --
MR. CLINE: And that he released that information. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, yes. So, it sounds like it's 
evidentiary, to tell you the truthr as much as I hate to say 
so. I think 1 told you we only had about an hour this morning, 
and I don't know how I determine that. I have your statement. 
I have Mr. Wail's affidavit that says basically don't know. I 
didn't have that relationship with Mr. Cline. I have a -- I 
den' t knew how to decide that sort of evidence from both of 
you . 
MR. CLINE: Sc, it would continue that, then, now? 
THE COURT: I think we have to. 
MR. CLINE: That's fine. That's fine now. 
THE COURT: Okay, Otherwise, what did you understand 
to address today? Every time we meet it's in. the nature of 
review, but there are limited things that could have occurred 
in the almost three weeks Mr. Cline has been in jail. 
Are there issues that have arisen during this time --
this is for Mr. Wall or Ms. Blomquist -- that ycu wish to 
address today. Why don't we talk about what else we might 
ne^d to address or should address before we make determination 
on the protective order and custody. 
(Conclusion of Mr. Cline's testimony.) 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 12, 2003) 
3 (Pro se arguments of Mr. Earl Cline) 
4 THE COURT: Mr, Cline, respond please, sir, anyway you 
5 wish. 
6 MR, CLINE: Your Honor, can I request that you release 
7 just one of these? 
8 THE COURT: You are able to do that to take notes. That 
9 is fine. 
10 MR. CLINE: And then I need a pen or a pencil or 
11 I something, 
12 j THE COURT: Bryan, do you have an extra? 
13 UNIDENTIFIED: I have one, your Honor, 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 MR. CLINE: I have a number of things, your Honor, and 
16 then— 
17 THE COURT: On the protective order? 
18 MR. CLINE: On the protective order only. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. CLINE: All right. That onefs done. That oners 
21 done. Okay. A couple of things, your Honor. Number one -- and 
22 because I didn't have a chance to check the law library, I looked 
2 3 at this a few months ago. The State of Utah redid the protective 
24 order laws, okay. All protective orders that involve children 
25 have to be done through juvenile court. 
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1 THE COURT: Nor if they're only for the protection of 
2 j children. There's a distinction. It's a very important one. If 
3 it's a protective order for the protection of children, m behalf 
4 of minor children, then they go to the juvenile court. If 
5 they — protective orders involving adults that have an impact on 
6 I children go to district court. 
7 MR. CLINE: And I — like I said, I didn't get the 
8 chance to go back and read the statute, okay, and so that may be 
9 I correct. 
10 THE COURT: I can assure you it's correct. 
11 MR. CLINE: Okay. 
12 THE COURT: It was a very hotly debated issue, and I'm 
13 a member of the state judicial council. We're the ones who make 
14 the determination whether we back or not this kind of 
15 legislation. This was hotly debated for about a year. And 
16 interestingly, what has happened by transferring the children 
17 ones to the juvenile court is the numbers have exploded because 
18 I parents are using the children as pawns and they're going to the 
19 juvenile court to try and get an advantage in divorces, and so 
20 now we're reconsidering — considering running new legislation to 
21 get rid of that loophole. But I can assure you the distinction 
22 is very real. This is a protective order between two adults. 
23 This is a district court protective order* 
24 MR. CLINE: Yeah, but she also has included the 
25 children. 
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1 THE COURT: Yes, but they almost always include 
2 children. What we moved from the district court were cases where 
3 I you do not include the adults. 
4 MR. CLINE: And that's fine, I'm not— 
5 THE COURT: That's the law. Just so you know, okay? 
6 MR. CLINE: Okay. I don't believe that there's any 
7 concept for reinstating a protective order. I believe that 
8 the May 9- protective order was dismissed. There was an 
9 evidentiary--
10 THE COURT: This isn't a reinstatement. It's a new 
11 protective order. 
12 MR. CLINE: Okay, it was — 
13 THE COURT: The question is whether any prior acts can 
14 be used in support of a new protective order. This is not a 
15 reinstatement. 
16 MR. CLINE: Okay. Most of the issues that she's 
17 J alleged that are new issues have already been -- they're issues 
18 of contempt, okay, and she's listed things in there that have 
19 absolutely nothing to do with the protective order. 
20 THE COURT: But we're not deciding contempt, and don't 
21 worry about that. 
22 MR. CLINE: But it— 
2 3 THE COURT: What they have be are incidences of 
24 cohabitant abuse, and they're clearly defined, and that's what 
25 you need to focus on. 
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1 I MR. CLINE: And I'll get there in just a minute. 
2 THE COURT: Just so you know. I mean that's all I'm 
3 going to look at in terms of whether she has support. The fact 
4 that I found contempt does not of itself give any support to the 
5 protective order petition. 
6 MR- CLINE: Well, and actually your Honor, it would 
7 constitute an additional punishment for contempt, and the statute 
8 is very clear that I (inaudible) $1,000, In fact, the statute 
9 doesn't even allow an award--
10 THE COURT: I agree, except that a protective order 
11 is not a punishment. A protective order is an order to cease 
12 or don't do something. But that's not what we're doing. We're 
13 looking for instances -- conduct that would be a form of 
14 cohabitant abuse which has to support the issuance of protective 
15 order. 
16 I mean Mr. Wall said a very telling thing. You need to 
17 realize this. He has seen a lot of protective orders alleging a 
18 lot less. They do. You can get a protective order based on one 
19 shout, for example, but you don't need physical contact. Actions 
20 that create a reasonable apprehension of physical threat, and 
21 that's why history matters here because what we have is a 
22 context, and the context is is there here a climate of threat, 
2 3 intimidation, et cetera that would cause the petitioner to 
2 4 consider your actions to be more threatening than they might 
25 without that context. That's where the history comes in. 
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And I would petition the Court, your Honor, 
and you look at the history, in every single 
as alleged, she's the one that started the 
She's the one that came in screaming, "I 
rder against this man. You have to get him 
Uh-huh. 
The — I mean -- and I want to address this 
for a second because it was never ever addressed. Okay. 
initial 
my son, 
THE 
MR. 
protective order that she had, she listed that I had 
Robert 
; COURT: 
CLINE: 
Uh-huh. 
She listed that I had pushed Robert down 
the concrete and I had slaimied his head into the ground and 
I had sat on him. Okay. We went to a hearing which was a 
1 which 
the CP5 
THE 
MR. 
Robert 1 
worker < 
, COURT: 
CLINE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. 
11 see a 
findings of 
was 
CLINE: 
copy o 
testified, Alexis testified, Julie testified 
all testified. 
Was this in juvenile court? 
It was in juvenile court. 
Okay. 
Okay. It was on October 17th. In my motion 
f that order. You'll see a copy of the 
the Court and that they dismissed it all. There 
no violence against Robert. 
In fact, Robert testified that, "Dad didn't throw me on 
1 the concrete, I was trying to assault my mom and dad took me and 
2 threw me on the bed." And because he was trying to throw his 
3 arms against me I took his arms and put them behind his back and 
4 I said, "When you settle down I'm going to let you up out of 
5 [ here." Okay, I wasn't abusing my son. Okay. It was used 
6 against me to get a protective order, and it's typical of every 
7 single thing that has gone on in this* 
8 I Okay. She takes an incident and she takes and blows 
9 | this up out of proportion, okey, and quite honestly, I think 
10 she's a pathological liar, okay, because she's been able to do 
11 this over and over and over and over again, and I've got incident 
12 after incident. I've got 17 incidents in here in her petition 
13 that are specific lies that I can prove, okay. 
14 The Court — the legislature allows you to use an ex 
15 parte protective order on the condition that if you can prove 
16 that she lies that she be charged with a felony. Okay. And I've 
17 got 17 of them. Just— 
18 THE COURT; Well, you understand, I don't charge 
19 I felonies. If you think you have that evidence you take it to the 
20 district attorney. 
21 MR. CLINE: I tried to get it to the district attorneys. 
22 I've tried before, 
23 THE COURT: Well, I'm just saying that's the way that 
24 works. You're right. There is that penalty. 
25 MR. CLINE: And— 
-9-
1 THE COURT: But I still have to look at today whether 
2 there are incidents that support the issuance of the order. And 
3 why don't you just focus on anything in the claim — in the 
4 petition that postdates the agreement to dismiss the first — 
5 the last one. 
6 MR. CLINE: Well, I would like to make one thing clear 
7 first of allf because she alleged that I pushed her in the 
8 closet, okayr and I did not* And I wish I could go up and draw 
9 on the board our closet so that you could see exactly what 
10 I happened, your Honor, because she did not deserve the original 
11 protective order. 
12 We have a six-by-eight closet, okay. It's a walk-in 
13 closet and there was no door on it. All I did is lean on the 
14 dresser that was outside of the door. The argument, if you could 
15 call it an argument, started while we were sitting at the bath --
16 she was in the bathtub and I was sitting on the toilet. She had 
17 I asked me to bring some eye makeup •— some eye remover so she 
18 could take her makeup off while she was sitting in the tub. 
19 I I took a phone call. I came back in, and this is ail --
20 I don't know if — you said that you got a copy of the original 
21 I protective order. Did you get a copy of my response to it? 
22 THE COURT: Well, original. I have five of these. 
23 Which one do you mean? 
24 MR. CLINE: Yes. I'm talking about the one from May 1:\ 
25 j I filed about a six or eight page affidavit, and in there I also 
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1 j filed an affidavit from my sister that showed that the day before 
2 this event occurred that Julie had told ray sister that she didn't 
3 I believe that Earl was going to be able to go to a baptism on 
4 Saturday of my niece. In other words, Julie knew about this 
5 prior to the fact— 
6 THE COURT: Can we focus on incidents in this case 
7 subsequent to the last order, because you need to understand I'm 
8 fairly constrained by the law. If these incidents occurred or if 
9 I believe they occurred, and if even one of them occurred I issue 
10 the order. That's what the law says. 
11 Your complaints about lies and all the rest, you're 
12 going to have to take that to a different place unless they can 
13 show me that I shouldn't believe anything that's been said in 
14 this case. 
15 MR. CLINE: Well, the discipline of the boys was 
16 I dismissed, and yet she brings it up again. She has a copy of 
17 it. She was there at the hearing, 
18 THE COURT: Well, a lot of things were brought up again. 
19 I I want you to focus on the things that have occurred allegedly 
20 since the last order, 
21 MR, CLINE: She's alleged that Kevin Brown--
22 THE COURT: That what occurred? 
23 MR, CLINE: She's alleged that Kevin Brown was at the 
24 hearing. Kevin Brown was never anywhere near the hearing. 
25 THE COURT: Which hearing? 
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1 MR. CLINE: She alleged that on the October 11^' that 
2 Kevin Brown was there and pleaded that the children not be 
3 allowed to testify, and that's absolutely false, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: That's the hearing at the juvenile court, 
5 ] MR. CLINE: Yes, but yet she brought this in and used 
6 that as somehow that I had harassed her and this is a current 
7 issue. Okay. She uses it -- and let me just — let's just go to 
8 I the -- I'm going to go through the pages that -- and I apologize. 
9 I mean she's written six to eight pages here, and you're asking 
10 j me to spend five minutes and— 
11 THE COURT: Well, take what you need, but focus. 
12 MR. CLINE: —and try and go through all of this stuff. 
13 Okay, paragraph — the first page, all right. It says 1 often 
14 discipline the boys excessively by beating them with a belt, 
15 I throwing them against walls and sitting on them to restrain them. 
16 That was already heard in a trial in juvenile court and it was 
17 dismissed, and it was dismissed about six weeks ago. Okay. 
18 She says she's been forced to call the police to help 
19 resolve those situations. Again, I was the one that had Robert 
20 pinned down and said, "Julie, Robert needs to go for a time out. 
21 Will you please go call the police while I hold him because he's 
22 not going to settle down." I didn't excessively — she did call 
23 the police and she's making -- I mean againf this is all 
24 (inaudible) . 
25 I She says I stalked a boyfriend for the entire 17 years 
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1 of the marriage. Okay. That was already heard on May 9~-\ In 
2 fact, all of the stuff in the history -- every single bit of it 
3 was heard on May ST-h. There was a — she filed a petition. It 
4 was denied. We went in for a hearing and Commissioner Casey 
5 heard every bit of it in an evidentiary hearing and it was all 
6 denied. Okay. 
7 THE COURT: Now that's the— 
8 MR. CLINE: If you look at it, it's — 
9 THE COURT: I'm looking at it. A very short minute 
10 entry. It says, vFor reasons stated on the record petition for 
11 protective order filed by petitioner is denied." That's May 9, 
12 2002, and then they refer to the divorce case. But you say 
13 there's an evidentiary hearing? 
14 MR. CLINE: We did have an evidentiary hearing in front 
15 I of Commissioner Casey and she — it was denied, but he still 
16 ordered us to come m for an evidentiary hearing. 
17 THE COURT; What I don't see in that file is any order 
18 I resulting from that hearing or anything signed off on by the 
19 I judge, so I don't know how you have an order of res judicata. 
20 MR. CLINE: Well, I — it wouldn't have been my 
21 responsibility t o — 
22 THE COURT: Well, I'm saying the last thing in there are 
23 the minutes for the protective order. That is not a conclusive 
24 judgment on the merits. Understood? 
25 MR. CLINE: But--
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THE COURT: I mean if— 
MR* WALL; I might indicate, your Honor, that 
1 Commissioner Casey's comment was he wanted Commissioner Evans to 
hear it 
MR. CLINE: Steve didn't -- wasn't in attendance there. 
1 okay. He wasn't even there in attendance. 
client--
] reports 
skipped 
and all. 
garage. 
my car. 
trespass 
hearing. 
That is 
MR. WALL; Nof but that's — I'm relating what my 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Continue, Mr. Cline. 
MR. CLINE; Okay. It says that I filed false police 
against her on June 14th, okay. On this one — and I 
the other stuff about blatant lies against her family 
None of this is abuse, I stole the Mazda cut of the 
It's not abuse. It's not anything to do — and it was 
THE COURT: But don't you understand that even a 
» can be domestic violence abuse? 
MR. CLINE: If I had permission to go there--
THE COURT: That is not what I think I found at the last 
MR. CLINE: No, but we had evidence submitted— 
THE COURT: Nof but I found to the contrary. 
MR. CLINE: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Weil, I mean that's what you're stuck with. 
res judicata. This Court determined that you did not, so 
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1 that's where you're stuck on that one. 
2 MR. CLINE: It says that I filed false police reports, 
3 I okay. The family party was on the 13th. It was on Friday night, 
4 I It was Father's Day weekend and it was my weekend and I allowed 
5 her to take the children up on her week -- on my weekend to go up 
6 and — because she had a wedding, a belated wedding reception, 
7 j okay, and I allowed her to do that. And then she called me up 
8 and said, "Do you mind if they spend the night Friday and we'll 
9 get them back to you on Saturday." 
10 Robert was there. Believe it or not I had been trying 
11 very hard to get Robert to establish a relationship with his 
12 mother, okay, and so I insisted that he go to that and -- in 
13 J spite of the fact that he was very angry and was very frustrated, 
14 I sent Robert up there and they would not allow him to 
15 spend the night. He got up the next morning. He said, "Dad, I 
16 had a wonderful time with my grandfather." He said, "I got to 
17 see my uncles. Will you please drive me up there so that I can 
18 spend the day with my aunts and uncles and cousins and everybody 
19 else?'' 
20 I called up and I got permission, okay, and she said, 
21 "If you bring Robert up why don't you take the rest of the kids." 
22 So I drove all the way up there. I'm sitting there parked — 
23 and I pulled clear away from the house because there is a 
24 J restrain — there's a mutual restraining order between myself and 
25 Mrs. Packard. But it says that we can go to any kind of family 
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1 parties or baptisms as long as we stay away from each other and 
2 we don't argue with each other. So I was not in violation of 
3 that restraining order. Mrs* Packard didn't even come out. 
4 I'm sitting there waiting for Sierra who had -- they 
5 couldn't find her shoes, and I was waiting there for about 20 
6 minutes when David comes out, and he and I are sitting on my car 
7 watching the boys and laughing and joking about some things. All 
8 of a sudden Robert comes out of the house going, "Let's get out 
9 of here. Dad- Grandpa is being an asshole," Excuse me. But 
10 that was his exact words• 
11 I said, "What's going on, Robert?" He says, "Grandpa 
12 is in there being an asshole again." I said, "All right, let's 
13 get the kids and let's get out of here." He sat in the car. 
14 Mr. Packard comes running out of the house. He grabs me by my 
15 shoulder and throws me up against the car with five of my 
16 children sitting in the car and says, "Let's—" he said, "When 
17 are you going to tell the children the truth about all of the 
18 I crap in this divorce and the liens that you have placed on this 
19 home." Okay. 
20 I He did throw me up against the car, and I had to drive 
21 five — six children home in my car -- actually five because Josh 
22 stayed up there. All those children came home in tears, okay. 
23 And I asked my mom to be here, but she apparently had something 
24 else, so she can testify to how incredibly upset those children 
25 were that their grandfather came out yelling at their dad and 
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1 threw him up against the car. And I have written statements at 
2 J home from Robert and Joshua that say that that m fact happened. 
3 Not only do I have written statements, but the next 
4 day -- that Monday — she took Joshua into Kevin Brown to try and 
5 get him — get Joshua to say that that didn't happen. 
6 Well, I called Kevin Brown a couple of days later, which 
7 is my right granted by court order, and I called Kevin Brown and 
8 he said, "You know what was funny, Joshua came in and Julie sat 
9 in there and tried to coax him into saying that that event didn't 
10 happen." He said, "As soon as Julie left Joshua came clean and 
11 told me, 'You know what, grandpa did push him. I saw it.'" 
12 Okay. 
13 So this crap that I made this stuff up, okay, this is 
14 incredible, you know. They call the police on me anytime I come 
15 I anywhere near their house. He comes out screaming at me, telling 
16 me that I need to tell my children the truth about something, 
17 I which would have gotten me in contempt of court for talking with 
18 them about the issues, then throws me up against the car, okay, 
19 and because he gets, you know, David and everybody else up there 
2 0 to lie to the police officer when Joshua actually told Kevin 
21 Brown the truth, okay. 
22 And if you want to get Kevin Brown on the phone — I 
23 mean I know you're not going to do that, okay, but we could get 
24 Kevin Brown on the phone and he could tell you exactly what 
2 5 happened. I intend to come back with an affidavit from Kevin. 
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1 I'm going to subpoena that, okay, to show the type of stuff that 
2 she has — that she has gotten. 
3 I She uses that I intimidated and harassed her by --
4 because she was asked to come to a court hearing. Okay. My 
5 goodness, you know. If she wants to be there as the accuser I 
6 have the right to face my accusers. It's a constitutional law. 
7 Okay. 
8 But she goes on for an entire half a page here about 
9 ail of the — how the Judge was wrong in his decision because he 
10 dismissed the charges and that I put the children up to do this 
11 and that. In that motion that you can't find, your Honor, it 
12 shows that I didn't subpoena Alexis. Alexis wasn't subpoenaed at 
13 all. She came voluntarily by phone and she didn't want to 
14 testify but she agreed to do it. 
15 My only counsel to her wasf "Alexis, if you want to 
16 testify, you feel free to do that, and your dad will love and 
17 care for you no matter what happens." And if I got the 
18 transcript of that and brought it in here you can see that I 
19 asked her about three questions and one of them was, "What did 
20 your dad tell you about this — or about testifying.'' She said, 
21 I uYou told me, dad, that you'd have to cross examine me, that 
22 you'd try to be very, very careful and cautious and that you 
23 would respect my feelings and that you would respect me for 
24 whatever I testified to." 
25 Okay, that is -- it's on the record in juvenile court. 
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1 It's on the record that Robert testified that none of this abuse 
2 happened, Alexis testified none of this abuse happened. 
3 THE COURT: See, even if all of this is true, talk to me 
4 about things like after you got out of jail and the conversations 
5 you had that Ms. Camp found threatening. You know what I'm 
6 talking about. 
7 MR* CLINE: Okay. And those are the only two things. 
8 Okay, number one, she's gone to this issue about me talking to 
9 Joshua again. It's a blatant lie, okay. Joshua called and --
10 well, let's go to the threat. 
11 Okay, October 26' . It's on page 4. I got out of jail, 
12 okay, I had my cell phone with me. I called her on the phone. 
13 I said, "Where is Christopher and Robert?'' She said, "Robert has 
14 taken your truck and he's gone to—" I forget where it was. I 
15 I said, "Why was he allowed to take my truck? Why does he have my 
16 truck? He's not supposed to have it." I said, "I didn't give 
17 him permission to take that." 
18 Well, Robert is serving time down in Southern Utah 
19 because of this issue while he was out of -- she said to me, 
20 "What's your intentions?" I said, "I'm going to come pick up my 
21 children, why?" She said, "No, really what — I need to know 
22 what your intentions are." I said, "What, are you afraid I'm 
23 going to come beat you up?" And I don't even remember if I said 
24 beat up and come and get you or something like that. I said, 
25 "I'm not. 1 have no intention of doing that. I just want to get 
-19-
1 my boys,'' okay. All right. 
2 THE COURT: Did you say something like, "Are you afraid 
3 I'm going to do something?" 
4 I MR. CLINE: I might have done that, okay, but your 
5 Honor, if —- but I said immediately thereafter, "I'm not. I'm 
6 just coming to get my boys," Okay. "I just want to get my boys, 
7 that's it." Okay. That's not abuse. It's not a threat, okay. 
8 THE COURT: Well, to some extent. A threat is how 
9 something is reasonably perceived, and that's where we get back 
10 I to where history matters. 
11 MR. CLINE: Well, then we're going to have to go back 
12 through all the history and— 
13 THE COURT: Well, we've done that, I can assure you. 
14 MR. CLINE: Okay. 
15 THE COURT; I know you differ — both of you -- on every 
16 issue that's occurred between you since the beginning of time, 
17 but nevertheless, we've seen the history, and it's a long 
18 history. I've seen history in this courtroom, and that's part 
19 of the problem. The climate of hostility of escalation creates a 
2 0 world where something that may otherwise have sounded innocent 
21 J does not seem innocent. 
22 MR. CLINE; Well, and your Honor, the only thing I can 
23 ask is that at the time that we were here on the 23rd, 24*-h, 
24 whenever it was of September, okay, you counseled me where you 
25 said, "Mr. Cline, you don't think you need to come back and get 
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1 her on contempt of court." You haven't seen — you haven't seen 
2 the flip side of all the contempt issues because I haven't 
3 I brought them before the Court. 
4 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
5 I MR. CLINE: Okay, and I can assure you, okay, that if I 
6 brought those before the Court you would look at that and say,, 
7 "Oh, my gosh, there's so much -- you know, it's not Mr. Cline, 
8 okay, it's her over and over again arguing, she'll — you know, 
9 and then turning around and changing her testimony." 
10 I THE COURT: And that might result in you being able — 
11 for example, just theoretically to get a protective order, but it 
12 would not necessarily result in Ms. Camp not being entitled tc 
13 j one unless you could show that everything she said was not true, 
14 that there was no truth in any of these incidents. 
15 MR. CLINE: Well, I don't believe that it was ever a 
16 threat, your Honor, okay. 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh, 
18 MR. CLINE: It was — 
19 THE COURT: Well, you may not have intended that it was 
2 0 one. My question is how is it reasonably perceived? 
21 MR. CLINE: Well, and I don't — you know, there was 
22 absolutely no threat in it whatsoever. It was just I am coming 
2 3 to get the boys, that is it, okay. 
24 This incident about Joshua, again, okay, she's brought 
25 in and alleged that my mom and dad told Christopher -- and that's 
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1 not true, either, because Joshua called my mom and dad and told 
2 my dad--
3 THE COURT: What your mother and father did is not, in 
4 my view, a basis for a protective order against you unless you 
5 put them up to it or something, and that does not appear to be 
6 the claim in this case, so I don't think you need to worry about 
7 j that one. 
8 MR- CLINE: Well, but the issue is that Joshua when he 
9 I called my dad knew how long I was sentenced for, okay. He knew--
10 THE COURT: But it's not an issue on the protective 
11 order. 
12 MR. CLINE: I know, but you've told me before that if 
13 1 I could show you that she has — that she is talking to those 
14 children and putting them up to saying things against their 
15 I father that you'd have her thrown in jail also. 
16 THE COURT: Well, you would have — we would have to dc 
17 a contempt hearing. I'm saying for now we're looking at a more 
1 8 narrow issue, 
19 MR. CLINE: Okay. And the last incident that she's 
20 got in here is that I swear in front of the children and it 
21 intimidates their -- you know, this is an incident, your Honor, 
22 because of what happened when I was incarcerated the last time, 
23 okay. 
24 I got Robert out. On the Saturday that she had him she 
2 5 allowed him — he was put on house arrest through probation and 
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1 I he was not to have friends and he was not to have any — he 
2 wasn't to go anywhere. She allowed him to take my truck and go 
3 I to Heber and ride horses. She then allowed him to go to his 
4 friends where he got drunk. 
5 He was called into work. He went into work, and cf ail 
6 the stupid things, Smith's sent him drunk knowing he was drunk 
7 back into the — to stack beer, okay. And he's a 17-year-old 
8 kid and he's stacking beer and he steals one while he's there 
9 and he puts another one — a 12-pack in the garbage can and 
10 wheels it out. Well, he got caught and he got fired, okay, and 
11 so that's — so while he's on house arrest he ends up — on 
12 Monday morning I talk to the probation officer, Chris -- I can't 
13 remember his last name. 
14 He said, "Robert is under your custody, and that means 
15 that you do not let him go to the bathroom without you standing 
16 at the door.7' He says, XHWe have a warrant that's ready to be 
17 signed and you are not to let him out of your sight." 
18 Okay. I took him down to register him for school hoping 
19 that by getting him in school that we could -- that we could 
20 soften the judge's heart and not send him off for 90 days or 
21 whatever it is she was threatening to do out of home placement. 
22 As we got out of there I said, "What do you want to do 
23 with your television and your DVD?" He said, "We ought to go 
24 pick them up, dad." He said, "Can you put them away for me?" 
25 nYes." 
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1 So I got him over theref and I called Julie and told her 
2 that we were coming. Robert goes in and I said, "Robert, you 
3 have 10 minutes." I said, "I am not going to violate the court 
4 order and I am not going to allow your mom to let me violate this 
5 court order by stalling you in there." I said, "That's all I 
6 need." I said, "You go on in there, you get your stuff and you 
7 get out." 
8 Okay, at six minutes I called and said, "I don't see 
9 Robert. You need to hurry." At eight minutes I called and said, 
10 "I don't see Robert and you need to hurry." At ten minutes I 
11 called and said, "Julie, I said at this point if he is not out 
12 here Robert is a fugitive from justice, okay, and I'm going to go 
13 call the police and I will have you charged with -- I'll have 
14 Robert charged with being a fugitive from justice," because his 
15 probation officer said, "Don't you let him out of your sight." 
16 She was screaming over the phone, "You can't do this. 
17 You can't take his stuff. It's ™ you know, it's not his." 
18 All -- yada, yada, yada, all sorts of stuff at me, okay. I said, 
19 "That's fine, I'm going to go down and I'm going to call the 
20 West Jordan Police Department and I'm going to have them come out 
21 I here and get in the middle of this because Robert is supposed to 
22 J be with me and he is supposed to have his stuff, okay. You can't 
23 withhold his stuff from him*" 
24 Okay. At that point I left to go get a phone book. 
25 When I came back Robert had his stuff on the ground, okay, and 
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1 she came out of the house screaming at me, "If you even dare cash 
2 that check of his--" and I said, "I don't even have his check," 
3 His check didn't come until that Friday. 
4 She said, "Robert signed papers in there and he's going 
5 to have you charged with a felony," and she's done all of this, 
6 you know, on and on and on and on and on and she is screaming at 
7 me, okay, at the top of her lungs in front of Robert. As she 
8 comes out of the stairs, "I'm going to do this, I'm going to have 
9 you thrown in jail. I'm going to have you this and that and 
10 that," and I turned around as I was leaving and I said, "Why 
11 don't you just go to hell," okay, and that's the extent of it. 
12 Okay. I know you're going to say, "Oh, there we go. 
13 I Escalation." 
14 THE COURT: Not alone. Not that alone. Can you hold 
15 just one moment before you continue because we may be able to lee 
16 these other people leave on these other matters. 
17 (Court handles other matters) 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Cline, you just said that, you know, you 
19 said, "Why don't you go to hell," or something and that then I'd 
20 say, "Well, there you go." Well, I wouldn't, but there are other 
21 factors, and we could talk all day, which everyone in this case 
22 seems capable of doing* But the bottom line is protective orders 
2 3 have been designed by the legislature to give people some peace 
24 of mind and some protection if they are threatened, are abused in 
2 5 any way in a domestic violence sense or under reasonable 
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1 J apprehension of physical harm. 
2 Although a lot of these incidents are old, although 
3 quite a few of them I agree do not amount to cohabitant abuse, 
4 in the totality, in the climate that has been created by both of 
5 you -- I mean this is not — it takes more than one person to 
6 create this climate. But within this climate the things you have 
7 done -- some of the things you have said, including specifically 
8 the comments after your release from jail the first time could 
9 reasonably be construed in this Court's opinion as threats or 
10 intimidation that is simply prohibited by the cohabitant abuse 
11 statute, 
12 Based on that I find there is a basis for issuance of a 
13 protective order. I am going to issue a permanent protective 
14 J order, and you have to make appropriate motions at any time that 
15 you feel you have evidence to do so to change or modify the terms 
16 I of that order. Otherwise dismissal will not occur unless by 
17 stipulation of the parties. 
18 Mr. Wall, there is a form as you are well aware. If you 
19 don't have one with you you can probably pick one up on the first 
2 0 floor, but I will ask you to prepare a form order -- it's simple 
21 that way for the officers — and just to make it track the ex 
22 parte order. Is there anything you're looking for that's 
23 different than the ex parte order? 
24 MR. WALL: No. 
2 5 MR. CLINE: Your Honor--
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1 J THE COURT: One moment, sir, and Irll come back to you. 
2 Do you have the ex parte order in front of you, sir? 
3 MR. CLINE: Yes, 
4 THE COURT: Are there any specifics in the ex parte 
5 order that you think could be changed that have impact on your 
6 ability to deal with the children? 
7 MR, CLINE: Yes, quite honestly. She — first of all, 
8 she's asked for her personal possessions back. This is not the 
9 place--
10 THE COURT: Well, and generally it's not, but since 
11 II have both cases, there — most of them shouldn't still be 
12 at issue this late in the case. Other things that have been 
13 talked about for some time, like the last item, the patriarchal 
14 blessing, let me ask you, do you have any of these things? 
15 MR. CLINE: She has her own patriarchal blessing. I had 
16 a photocopy of the patriarchal blessing. 
17 THE COURT: Well, you're not entitled to keep one if she 
18 doesn't want you to, but on this list, I agree that this may not 
19 be the place, but what do you have of hers that's on this list? 
20 MR. CLINE: Her journals I've given back to her, except 
21 for one journal which I'm using as evidence because it's — 
22 THE COURT: Weil, you don't get to keep it, though. Why 
23 would you get to keep it? You may have a basis to copy it for 
2 4 evidence, b u t — 
25 MR. CLINE: That's all -- I'd be happy to give it to 
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1 her. I have copies of it and they're submitted in that motion 
2 that we were supposed to hear today. I don't have the tape 
3 recorder. I testified that I gave that back to her. The journal 
4 I gave back to her. 
5 THE COURT: But there's at least one you still have you 
6 say? 
7 I MR. CLINE: That's the one that she listed as day 
8 planner. Her sister's email -- again, this was completely 
9 fictitious. Her sister brought boxes— 
10 THE COURT: I don't want a big argument. I want to know 
11 if you have it or don't have it. 
12 MR. CLINE: I don't have them. The Mazda Miata I do. 
13 It's titled and registered in my name— 
14 THE COURT: I'm holding that issue until another day. 
15 MR. CLINE: And I didn't steal that. 
16 THE COURT: Well, we'll talk about that later, but I'm 
17 not going to order in this — in connection with the protective 
18 order. That will have to be addressed through the divorce. 
19 MR. CLINE: Any children's clotnes that I have 
2 0 purchased, your Honor— 
21 THE COURT: That she has purchased. 
22 MR. CLINE: Yes. For six months, your Honor, I've had 
23 clothes and she's had clothes and we've sent them back and forth 
24 and back and forth and neither one of us cared as long as they 
25 I came in clean clothes because we knew eventually we'd get them 
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1 back again, 
2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
3 MR. CLINE: And that's the basis that we've operated on, 
4 1 and then all of a sudden a couple of months ago she got a wild 
5 I hair and decided that she wanted to— 
6 THE COURT: Do you have many clothes for the children? 
7 MR, CLINE: Do I have many clothes? 
8 THE COURT: I mean some odds and ends are no big deal, 
9 but if you have a stack of them that's another story. 
10 MR. CLINE: Of her clothes? 
11 THE COURT: The children's clothes that she purchased. 
12 MR, CLINE: No. No. And quite honestly I couldn't even 
13 tell you which ones were which. The last thing I need is a 
14 contempt of court order because she says that I have a t-shirt 
15 that I don't even know is hers or whatever. 
16 THE COURT: Well, and you both should have clothes at 
17 I both places. 
18 MR CLINE: Okay. Any personal items that belong to her 
19 parents. I don't have anything from her parents or other family 
20 I members. If she wants the copy of her patriarchal blessing— 
21 THE COURT: She wants all the copies in your possession. 
22 You have no reason to have that. 
23 MR. CLINE: And I can get it by going down to the church 
24 office building and they'll give me a copy of it. 
25 THE COURT: Well, that would be pretty outrageous. 
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How's th?t? 
Why would they give out someone's private 
Because you can go down and get a — you can 
sign a piece of paper and get a copy. 
COURT: 
CLINE: 
Get anybody's patriarchal blessing? 
Yes. 
WALL: Well, that's not true, your Honor. 1 
CLINE: 
CLINE: 
COURT: 
3h, but 
CLINE: 
COURT: 
it? 
CLINE: 
things 
That's not true. J 
It is. It is. I've done it. 1 
Well, that's between the other parties and 
I would find that rather shocking to say the 
Well, I've done it, so— 
Did you represent yourself as her husband 
No, my mom has been able to get them for 
like that, too. She got a copy of mine 1 
had been lost. She also -- Julie has a copy of 1 
COURT: Okay. But you know, sir, I just told you to 
Last copy and you said to me, ^Well, I can go get 
church 
ly inserting 
riately and 
anyway." Do you see why I think you are 
3 yourself into your ex^wife's life 
why that might be intimidating to somebody? 
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1 MR. CLINE: I'll be happy to give it back. 
2 THE COURT: No, I'm asking you, do you see why a comment 
3 like that makes me sit here and say, "This guy isn't getting it.'' 
4 I'm telling you to butt out of her life. 
5 I MR. CLINE: And I'm trying, your Honor. I seriously— 
6 THE COURT: Weil, that's a good step. "I'll go to the 
7 I church and get a patriarchal blessing directly from the church 
8 because no one is going to stop me getting what I want that's 
9 personal to her." Now I know you've read it. I know you know 
10 what's m it. It's not going to be news to you. But my point is 
11 I when you're told to get out of it, all you say is, "I've got 
12 another way, Judge.-" I'm ]ust saying be a little bit 
13 introspective here. Do you see why that's an issue? 
14 MR. CLINE: Your Honor, if I didn't have seven children 
15 with this woman I would love to go and move to a completely 
16 different state and get the hell out— 
17 THE COURT: Sir, what you have is seven children you're 
18 both parents to. You'll never divorce the children. 
19 MR. CLINE: That's — 
20 THE COURT: You're divorced from Julie Camp. She is 
21 I not your wife. She is not your sweetheart. She's not even your 
22 friend. That's pretty obvious. Get unentangled. 
23 MR. CLINE: I would love to, okay. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. CLINE: All of the issues — 
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Statement of All Persons, Whose Interests Might be Substantially 
Affected 
Persons who may be affected by this writ are: 
1. Earl Cline II, Respondent in Divorce 
2. Julie Marie Camp, Petitioner in Divorce. 
3. Michelle Bloomquist, Guardian ad Litem 
4. Steve Wall, Attorney for Petitioner frf Divorce. 
Statement of Issues Presented and Relief Sought 
Steve Wall is counsel for Julie Camp in this divorce case. He should 
be dismissed from the case for Conflict because he previously agreed to 
represent Earl Cline and then obtained confidential information from him. 
He then violated his oath of confidentially by disclosing Hiat to Jiiie, Her 
Mother and veilf possibly used it with the Guardian ad Litem early on in the 
case. Even if he didn't a'gree to a client relationship as he tried to state, he 
violated Rule 4.3 which states u(a) During the course of a lawyers 
representation of a client, the lawyer shall not give advice to an 
unrepresented person other then the advice to obtain council, (b) in dealing 
on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by council, a 
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresenteted person 
misunderstands the lawyers role in the matter, the lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding." 
Statement of Facts 
1. In the summer of 2001, on or about July 27, 2001, Earl and 
Julie were separated and a suggestion had been made that both 
should go to counseling and that Julies parents should attend. 
Steve Wall called on or about July 26, and was enquiring of Earl as 
to some of the issues involved in the separation. Julie and Earl, 
had both been very involved in helping Steve with Julies brother, 
Neil's divorce in which Steve represented Neil. Steve and Earl 
spoke for about an hour about various issues related to alleged 
abuse of Robert, issues of Julies parents in the marriage, financial 
issues surrounding the business, etc. Earl specifically asked Steve 
prior to any discussion if he would be able to file a simple un-
contested divorce action where he represented both of us. He said 
that he would. At that point Earl believed that anything that he 
told to Steve was confidential and should not be told to other 
parties. 
2. On or about July 27, 2001 Earl picked up a divorce packet from 
Steve Walls office. On July 29, 2001. Earl spent the night with 
Julie and woke up in the morning to go to a listing appointment. 
When he returned on July 30, at about 12:00 P.M. Julie was very 
upset. As it turned out Steve has called and spoke with Julies 
Mother and disclosed all sorts of issues that Earl had told Steve 
about including Earls feelings that Julies mother was trying to ruin 
the marriage. Many of the issues that Julie told Earl about were 
word for word as he had told them to Steve. On or about August 1, 
2001, Earl got a hold of Steve and he acknowledge that he had 
spoken with Julies Mother and admitted that he had told her some 
of the things that Earl and Steve had spoken about. They spoke 
again about issues of the marriage and he offered to try and 
mediate between Julie, her parents and Earl. Steve suggested that 
Julie and Earl also go to counseling. Respondent told him about a 
lot of the counseling that had already been done, and some of the 
recommendations of those councilors. At that point Earl told him 
that he felt like that would be a conflict of interest for him to 
4 
council us and then represent us in a divorce, he stated that he 
wouldn't be willing to do that anymore. Earl expressed 
disappointment that Steve had chosen to disclose what was thought 
to be information protected by client confidentiality privilege. 
Respondent sent an e-mail to the Office of Professional Conduct 
on or about Aug. 6, 2001. The decision was made at the time not 
to pursue an action against Steve as Earl was trying very hard to 
save his marriage and any new issues would have caused further 
conflict. About six months later Julie filed for Divorce in District 
Court and asked Steve Wall to represent her. 
3. In Motion for Temporary Orders filed on or about May of 2002, 
Earl made a Motion through then Counsel to the Court that Steve 
be dismissed for a conflict. To Earls knowledge that issue was 
never addressed by the Court. In an evidentiary hearing held on 
Sept 22, 2003, Judge Hilder herd about the previous request to 
have Steve disqualified and stated that Earl needed to bring a new 
formal Motion. In November of 2003 Earl made a formal motion 
to the court for the dismissal of Steve and on December 17, 2003 a 
hearing was held in Judge Hilder's Court. After Steve and Earl 
were sworn, and both testified, court made the following ruling. 
5 
"Respondent has not met his burden of showing that an 
attorney/client relationship was ever commenced between 
Respondent and Mr. Wall. It is not credible that a family 
lawyer of Mr. Wall's experience would consent to joint 
representation under the circumstances as stated by 
Respondent or even if things were going aiong smoothly 
because things change. In fact, this case has a history of 
problems and had not been going along smoothly for over a 
year before the alleged contact between Respondent and Mr. 
Wall occurred." 
"I find there was a contact and information shared however, 
even if an attorney/client relationship was established which I 
find it was not, the court finds the most critical information 
shared, that being information concerning Alan, was already 
provided through other sources. Therefore, using this 
information has not and would not be to respondent's 
disadvantage in the sense that it was acquired through 
confidential sources such as respondent alleges." With that 
Judge Hilder refused to disqualify Steve. 
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Earl maintains that Court was in error for not dismissing Steve. In 
Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp 1847, Courts ruled on what it 
takes to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict. "In order for a 
party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel on grounds of former 
representation to demonstrate that opposing counsel previously had 
implied attorney client relationship with party. Under Utah Law, 
party must show that it submitted confidential information to 
lawyer and that it did so with the reasonable belief that lawyer was 
acting as party's attorney." (See Points of Authority for rest of 
cases and rulings that support this petition). In fact Nelson v. 
Green builder Inc. 823 F. Supp. 1493, it states; "Party establishes 
implied attorney-client relationship if it shows that it submitted 
confidential information to the lawyer and that is did so with the 
reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as parties attorney". On 
that basis the court already found enough reason to disqualify 
Steve. 
Typically Courts apply a very strict standard of proof when 
evaluating evidence to refute existence of client relationship and 
should resolve any doubt in favor of disqualification. {LaSalle 
Nat 7 Bank 703 F.2d 257). If Steve is allowed to continue on in the 
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case, Earl will not be able to have a fair trial. Court Ruled that a 
disqualification would result in a significant interruption to the 
course of justice. Earl maintains that the fact that Steve didn't 
disqualify himself early on in the trial has already lead to a 
"significant interruption to the course of justice". Ignoring that 
fact will not fix the issue, but will only allow the problem to 
continue to perpetuate its-self. 
Statement of Reasons for Needing this Remedy 
During the hearing on December 17, 2003, Judge Hilder set a trial 
date for March first and second. A couple of days later, he sent a memo in 
which he refused to hear any motions for reconsideration or any other 
motions till the day of trial. At that point it will be two late to do anything 
about this issue., and irreversible damage will be done to Earl and his chance 
for a fair trial. This is truly the only way to get justice at this point. 
Memorandum of Points of Authority 
Poly Software v. Yu Su, 880 F. Supp 1847 
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[2] Party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel because of a former 
representation under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must demonstrate that a 
previous attorney-client relationship arose with the moving party; that 
present litigation is substantially factually related to previous representation; 
and that attorney's present client's interest are materially adverse to movent. 
[3] In order for a party wishing to disqualify opposing counsel on grounds of 
former representation to demonstrate that opposing counsel previously had 
implied attorney client relationship with party. Under Utah Law, party must 
show that it submitted confidential information to lawyer and that it did so 
with the reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as party's attorney. 
Cole v, Raisoso 43 F.3d 1373 
[26] Threshold question for court when ruling on motion to disqualify 
opposing counsel on ground of former representation is whether there was 
attorney client relationship that would subject opposing counsel to ethical 
obligation of preserving confidential communications and for these to have 
been attorney client relationship, party need not have executed a formal 
contract nor is existence of relationship dependent upon payment of fees; 
however, movent must show that it submitted confidential information to the 
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opposing counsel and did so with the reasonable belief that counsel was 
acting as movant's attorney. 
[27] To protect client confidentiality, party moving for disqualification of 
opposing counsel on grounds of a former representation need not reveal the 
substance of its communication to counsel for this would defeat purpose of 
disqualification; usually showing of circumstances and subject of 
consultation will be enough to demonstrate whether information was 
confidential. 
Threshold of Reasonableness of Belief 
Nelson v. Green Builder Inc. 823 F. Supp. 1439 
[4] Party establishes implied attorney-client relationship if it shows that it 
submitted confidential information to the lawyer and that is did so with the 
reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as parties attorney. 
[5] To create attorney-client relationship it is not necessary that parties 
execute formal contract, or that relationship be dependent upon payment of 
fees; fiduciary relationship may arrive solely from nature work performed 
and circumstances under which confidential information is divulged. 
[6] Lawyer may not switch sides in substantially related representations; 
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[7] Representation is substantially related to prior representation when 
lawyer could have obtained confidential information in first that would have 
been relevant in second. 
[8] If substantial relationship is found between present and prior 
representations, it is unnecessary for former client to prove that lawyer 
actually received confidential information and used it against him or her; 
more-over, attorney or party need not divulge any conflicts to prove that 
thev were revealed. 
[9] Substantial relationship test for disqualification requires three-part 
inquiry. First, scope of prior legal representation must be factually 
reconstructed; Second, court must determine whether it is reasonable to infer 
that confidential information allegedly given would have been given to 
lawyer representing client in prior matters; Third, court must decide whether 
that information is relevant to issues raised in litigation pending against 
former client. 
[10] If the court finds that the representation are substantially related, then 
presumption arises that lawyer received confidential information during his 
or her prior representation. 
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[11] When a lawyer switches sides in litigation, presumption of shared 
confidences is irrebuttable and thus disqualification is proper, absent consent 
of, or waiver by former client. 
pp. 1448 "The courts apply a very strict standard of proof when evaluation 
evidence offered to rebut the two presumptions of shared confidences on a 
motion for imputed disqualification. This heavy rebuttal burden is satisfied 
only with "clear and effective" proof. Moreover the court resolves any 
doubt at to the existence of and asserted conflict of interest in favor of 
disqualification "LaSalle Nat'l Bank 703 F.2d 257, (citing Gulf Oil, 588, 
F.2d at 225)"". 
Dalrvmple v. Nat. Bank and Trust Co of Traverse City, 615 F, Supp. 
979 
[l]In determining whether attorney client relationship has been created, 
focus is on client; subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in his 
professional capacity, and on his intent to seek professional legal advice. 
[2] To disqualify counsel on basis of conflict of interest between former and 
present clients, it is first necessary to show that attorney-client relationship 
exists or has existed between counsel and the party seeking disqualification, 
but not necessary that a strict contractual relationship exists, as relationship 
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may be implied, and foremost among underlying concern is the possibility of 
attorneys disloyalty and breach of faith towards one who is previously 
entrusted him with confidences. 
[7] Inquire in cases in which disqualification of attorney brought on grounds 
of previous representation of opposing party is whether attorney was in 
position to acquire confidences of his clients; the actual receipt of such 
confidential information is irrelevant. 
[8] Implied attorney client relationship exists whenever lay party submits 
confidential information to an attorney whom he reasonably believes is 
acting to further his interests 
Kearns v. Fred Lavery/Porsche Audi Co, 573 F. 91 
[1] The attorney-client privilege attaches and one is considered a client, 
whenever one consults a lawyer with the view to obtaining professional legal 
services. 
[2] Attorney who represented defendant in patent infringement case and 
who had consulted with plaintiff in a suit against same patents was 
disqualified from further representation of defendants because he had 
received confidential information concerning the other, substantially related 
case; for attorney to continue his representation would have involved breach 
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of his fiduciary obligation and would have undermined integrity of attorney 
client privilege. 
pp.95 "and in Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana Inc., 546 F.2d 706 it was held; 
The basic policies underlying and judicially-compelled withdrawal of 
counsel because of potential conflicts of interest can be found in canons 4 
and 9 of the ABA code of professional responsibility ... Read together, the 
two cannons indicate that an attorney may be required to withdraw form the 
case where there exists even an appearance of a conflict of interest. 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.6 (a) states "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
representation of a client except as stated in paragraph (b) unless the client 
consents after consultation." 
Rule 1.7 states "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of 
the client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer 
reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and (2) Each Client consents after 
consultation. 
Rule 1.8 (b) states "A lawyer shall not use information relating to the 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client 
consents after consultation. 
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Rule 1.9 states "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or substantial 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents 
after consultation; or ...". 
1.16 states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation 
has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if; (a)(1) 
the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct 
or other law". 
For all of these reasons Respondent prays that this petition will be granted as 
it is in the best interest of Justice. 
/ da* of ^ Signed this j j d a y , ' ^ , 2004 
Pro Se Appellant 
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Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JULIE MARIE CLINE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
EARL LAVERE CLINE, II, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
MODIFY TEMPORARY ORDERS 
Civil No. 024902228 DA 
Judge Robert K. Hiider 
Coram. Michael S. Evans 
'Alt. A VVA; I ;A,P.C.) 
T'tRNTYSATSAVV 
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,A<1 Ci'X I'TAH 84124 
Respondent's Motion to Modify Temporary Orders cair.e on 
regularly for hearing on December 17, 2003, before the Honorable 
Robert K. Hiider, District Court Judge. The Petitioner was 
present, in person and through counsel, Steven B. Wall. The 
Respondent was present, appearing Pre Se. The Guardian Ad Litem, 
Michelle Biomquist was present appearing on behalf of the minor 
children. All parties having made argument and proffers to the 
Court, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the concents 
of che file and being fully advised in the premises, the Court made 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. With respect to Respondent's Motion to Disqualify the 
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Guardian Ad Litem, the Court finds the allegations of abuse are 
still very much at issue; that no conflicts have been shown and no 
other legal basis exists to disqualify said Guardian Ad Litem's 
office generally or Guardian Ad Litem Blomquist, specifically. 
2. With respect to Respondent's motion to disqualify 
Petitioner's counsel, Steven B. Wall, the Court finds that when an 
opposing party challenges a party's right to be represented by the 
counsel of their choice, the Court must look at the motivation of 
the party requesting the removal. 
3. Respondent has not met his burden of showing that an 
attorney/client relationship was ever commenced between Respondent 
and Mr. Wall. It is not credible that a family lawyer of Mr. 
Wall's experience would consent to joint representation under the 
circumstances as stated by Respondent or even if things were going 
along smoothly because things change. In fact, this case has a 
history of problems and had not been going along smoothly for over 
a year before the alleged contact between Respondent and Mr. Wall 
occurred. 
5. I find there was a contact and information shared, 
however, even if an attorney/client relationship was established 
which I find it was not, the Court finds the most critical 
information shared, that being the information concerning Alan, was 
already provided through other sources. Therefore, using this 
information has not and would not be to Respondent's disadvantage 
in the sense that it was acquired through confidential sources such 
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as Respondent alleges. Respondent disclosed this same information 
himself to Petitioner, who then disclosed it to others. So the 
disadvantage didn't arise by Respondent's disclosures to Mr. Wall. 
Therefore, the Court finds no attorney/client relationship existed, 
no information was given exclusively through that alleged 
relationship and used to Respondent's disadvantage and finally 
recognizing both of these factors and a person's right to choose 
his or her own counsel, the status of this case and ultimately the 
best interests of the children, the Court finds that a significant 
interruption to the course of justice would occur to delay these 
proceedings further by a disqualification when everyone needs 
resolution, particularly the children. As an aside, even if the 
Court found an attorney/client relationship and the use of the 
information contrary to Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the Court would still have serious concerns about 
disqualification, however, the Court finds that this situation 
doesn't even get there. 
Based thereon and based upon the findings of the Court and 
good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Respondent's Motion for Disqualification of the Guardian 
Ad Litem's office and/or Guardian Ad Litem, Michelle Blomquist is 
denied. 
2. Respondent's Motion for Disqualification of Petitioner's 
counsel, Steven B. Wall, is denied. 
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3. Neither party is allowed to file their 2003 tax returns 
unless the parties agree in writing on how the parties divide the 
children as exemptions. 
4. Respondent has ten (10) days from Decerriber 17, 2 003, to 
file his objection to Petitioner's request for attorney's fees as 
requested in her Order on Contempt Hearing Held September 24, 2003, 
and to Petitioner's proposed Order on the hearing held November 25, 
2003. 
5. All other issues in Respondent's Motion to Modify 
Temporary Orders is reserved to final trial. 
6. Respondent is to provide Petitioner's counsel a copy of 
the certificate which certifies he is eligible to ordain the 
parties' minor child, Joshua, to the office deacon. 
The foregoing Order on Respondent's Motion to Modify Temporary 
Orders, has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. 
9.1 
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Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) 
days following hand-delivery, or ten (10) days if service by mail, 
for the opposing party to submit notice of objection. If such 
objection, as to form, is not received within the subscribed time 
period, said Order will be executed by the Court. 
DATED this 3LI day of /Xc^Uy^cyf/^'1 . 2003. 
k>ny / EN B. WALL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing/Order on Respondent's Motion to Modify Temporary Orders, 
was [j/j mailed, postage prepaid, [ ] sent via^facsimile 
transmission, [ ] hand-delivered on thi 
2003, to the following: 
y
l i t ^ L flay of /y&nU{^ 
Earl Lavere Cline, II 
Respondent/Pro Se 
1565 East 7200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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1565 E 7200S 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JULIE MARIE CLINE 
Petitioner, 
Vs. 
EARL LAVERE CLINE II 
Respondent. ) 
Motion to Amend 
Judgment and or Ordor 
Civil No.: 024902228DA 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
Respondent Pro Se herby presents Motion to Amend Judgment and or Order, per rule 
59 (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was ordered on December 17, 
2003, on the grounds that there was error of Law. 
Respondent begins by acknowledging receipt of Judge Hilders interim ruling in this 
case, that he will respond to no more motions from either party, til! the time of trial. 
But with that said, Respondent still feels that to maintain his rights to appeal in this 
case that this motion is necessary. Therefore he is responding for the record. 
Respondent also argues the fact that at this point in the case, the Interim ruling is 
probably a violation of Due Process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the constitution of the United States for the various reason which will 
be enumerated below. 
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4. Respondent feels like it is discriminatory against him for various reasons including; 
Petitioner was allowed to file an incredibly lengthy volume of papers in her Motion 
for Order to Show Cause Dated April 11,2003.( 98 pages long). No decision was 
made by the court at that time that limited her access to the courts. She was then 
granted an opportunity to have her side told in a three day evidentiary hearing, and 
subsequently in two review hearings and a Protective order hearing. Court has 
specifically objected to motions from Respondent because of the length of them. 
Respondent notes that the specific Order that Respondent was objecting to was 14 
Pages long. Affidavit for Attorney fees was also six pages long. Respondent is 
merely responding to the volumes of paperwork that Petitioner has written. In any 
event the court avoiding a decision on the issues raised in those motions for re-
consideration serve no valuable purpose except to delay Respondents access to his 
constitutionally protected right to appeal those decisions of the Court, that 
Respondent believes are patently in error. 
5. This continues to keep Respondent held illegally in states custody by not allowing 
him the right to do many things that he would normally be entitled to if he didn't have 
the allegation of past due child support over his head. For example, Marriage is a 
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of Respondents religious 
beliefs, he can not be granted permission to re-many in accordance to his religious 
beliefs, till he is current on child support Surprisingly, if he is allowed to re-marry it 
may help all of his children, but it is most assuredly in the best interest of Chris and 
Robert. Marriage may also help Respondent financially to recover from all the issues 
that have combined to destroy his finances over the last two years ofthis divorce. 
2 
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Delaying a decision on the issues with the guise of benefiting the children is really 
hurting them. 
6. Judgment of past due child support also prohibits Respondent from getting a better 
job. I am not sure how that is benefiting the children or anyone else in this case. 
Respondent could come up with many more reasons why the courts decision violates 
the rights of due process and other civil rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The charge of Discrimination based 
upon Sex has already been make in this case. In the interest of time he will reserve 
those till later. 
7. Court argued that another reason for not addressing the child support issue is that 
"Respondent has un-clean hands". If that is the case, then why did Petitioner get 
Respondent sent to Jail for Contempt of Court when each and every allegation that 
she made against Respondent, she was in violation of court orders first, (see Affidavit 
in Support of Order To Show Cause, by Respondent). Even with respect to the child 
support issue. Petitioner has un-clean hands as she admitted that at one time she was 
working at the real estate business with Respondent, and has now stopped. 
Respondent has had to work harder just to make up for her refusal to work. She also 
knowingly provided a false and fraudulent affidavit attempting to overstate how much 
money Respondent made. Commissioner Evans even stated on the record that he 
knew she was lying. 
8. At this point the court has sentenced Respondent to four days in jail while knowing 
that the child support order may be illegal, and when there was no written order upon 
which to have him committed. (Rule Since then Respondent was committed to 
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another twenty six days when at that time the court knew that the order was in 
violation of state and federal law. This has now subjected all partes to this divorce to 
the possibility of Malicious Prosecution, and other civil rights damages. Does any 
one believe the court has un-clean hands? Or are they just delaying the decision 
hoping to find some way to get out of the damage they have caused. At this point the 
courts action is continuing to keep Respondent in State Custody illegally in violation 
of USC 28 Section 2254, which allows filing of writ of Habeas Corpus in Federal 
Court. This courts action to delay the decision is unnecessary and should be re-
considered as it is in violation of federal law. All the legal work has been completed, 
all the court has to due is make a decision so that the parties can move on with there 
lives as soon as possible. This is really in the best interest of the children also. The 
court seems to forget that Respondent has charge of some of the minor children and 
the courts are really hurting those children by their actions. 
9. With respect to the issue of dismissing the guardian ad litem, Respondent objects to 
the court not dismissing her as an error of law. The allegation of Child abuse against 
Respondent was fraudulent as CPS worker prior to divorce dismissed those charges 
and Guardian ad Litem Anthony Ferdon was involved in and knew what happened. 
When the charges re-appeared after Michelle Bloomquist talked to CPS worker it is 
evident that they were done to discredit Respondent in Divorce Court The fact that 
Guardian Ad Litems office was involved originally in the dismissal of those charges 
is evidence of fraud on the part of the guardian ad litem as the making of fraudulent 
child abuse charges is a crime per state law. Even if Michelle wasn't a party to 
making up the new charges, she had enough knowledge to know that CPS was in 
4 
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violation of the law. The interesting thing is that she has advocated over and over 
that the allegations of child abuse are hurting her clients, the Cline children, yet did 
she really do anything to protect them from this abuse by CPS. NO. That alone 
should be enough to have her dismissed for fraud and for not reporting a crime that 
was designed to hurt her clients. The malicious intent of CPS and the Guardian ad 
Litems office was so blatant that one of the CPS workers got caught lying in sworn 
testimony in court and it is documented in the dismissal order. Everyone wants to 
blame Respondent for the ugliness of the divorce, but even the courts have some 
reasonability because they have made orders on un-supported allegations, and then 
refused to fix them later when the allegations are proven to be false. 
10. But if that is not enough to justify a bias, look at the temporary orders that have been 
generated. Orders about seat belts, (at the time Respondents car was too small to 
transport all children at one time). Orders about spanking of children. {No order 
about wrapping them in duck tape or throwing them against the wall and damaging 
their shoulder, or throwing phones at them, or scratching their arms and leaving 
permanent scaring). Orders about taking their medicine. (No orders that the children 
continue to go to church in their mothers care). Christopher lives with his mother for 
several months and allegedly has continual problems with being aggressive with the 
children. After Respondent gets custody of him, Michelle recommends an order that 
Respondent has to keep him away from the other children. Why wasn't it 
recommended while Julie had custody of him. Alexis misses eight weeks of her 
Junior year of school. Christopher while living with his mother misses almost one 
half year of school. Ciera and Erika are compulsively late or missing in action at 
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school. Mom gets Josh excused from school for almost six weeks after the summer 
when he returned back to live with his mother. Alexis goes to only half of her classes 
the first half of her senior year and completely drops out the second half of her senior 
year. Respondent knows for certain that at least once in that time period that 
Michelle received a call from Mary Bailey, the head of Jordan School District 
attendance and still we don't have a single order even proposed by Michelle that the 
children need to go to school. Right now the children who are living with Petitioner 
have been out for over two months and again, we don't have any recommendation 
from the guardian ad litem that the children should be in school. Could this have 
anything to do with the fact that Christopher has almost perfect attendance while 
living with his father. And we suil don't see that she has a bias or been neglectful in 
her duties to protect the children. I don't think so. 
11. Courts decision not to disqualify Steve Wall is also in error of law for the following 
reasons. Paragraph two of purported findings of fact in purposed order from 
December 17,2003 hearing stated "when opposing party challenges a party's right to 
be represented by the counsel of their choice, the court must look at the motivation of 
the party requesting the removal". For the Record original motion was made by 
respondent with the very first paperwork filed in this divorce. Court argument that 
"at this late date it would only delay the process", is week given that the court is the 
one that twice already ignored Respondents motions to have Steve disqualified. 
Respondent also maintains that State law in relation to Lawyers Rules of Professional 
Conduct, should out weigh Petitioners right to have the council of her choice. 
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12. In paragraph three of Proposed Order, court alleges that "Respondent has not met his 
burden of proof \ The evidence used to support this was one of an argument of 
reason. For the record, Respondent testified very clearly and succinctly as to events 
that happened. That testimony included statements that Steve and Respondent not 
only talked about "Allen", but also talked about work history, marriage counseling, 
financial issues and more. Respondent has no idea whedier that information was used 
early on to his detriment, while Steve spoke with the Guardian ad Litem or others 
involved in the case. Steve could only testify as to what he believed he would do in 
that situation. Obviously on its face Respondents testimony was more credible than 
Steve's. The argument that "It is not Credible that a family lawyer of Mr. Wall's 
experience would consent to joint representation..." is flawed also. Would a lawyer 
of Mr. Walls experience knowingly allow his client to commit fraud by transferring a 
marital asset to her parents, when he should have know that it was in violation of state 
law and by so doing may enable Respondent to include Steve in law suit against 
Petitioner and her parents. It may also allow his legal file to be opened in discovery 
because of his knowledge of and possible participation in a crime. Would an 
experienced Guardian ad Litem of Michelle's experience really allow CPS workers to 
commit fraud and turn their clients lives upside down without trying to stop it? 
Would a District Court Judge with the experience and reputation equivalent to that of 
Judge Hilder really send someone to jail on an illegal child support order that is in 
violation of State and Federal Law? Would an attorney of Steve's caliber continually, 
and knowingly allow his client to commit perjury in court? I think the argument is 
flawed and court should have dismissed Steve on the Representation issue alone. 
7 
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13. Rule 11-101 States that Article VIII of the Utah Constitution gives the Supreme Court 
authority to make rules of Lawyer Conduct. That makes them a rule of law. Any 
rules that have "Shall and Shall Not" are imperatives. Rule 1.6 (a) states "a lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client except as stated in 
paragraph (b) unless the client consents after consultation/' None of paragraph (b) 
have any thing to do with this case. Therefore Steve had no excuse to release that 
information to Mrs. Packer. 
14. Rule 1.7 states "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client 
will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) Each Client consents after consultation. Neither of those would be reasonable in 
this case. 
15. Rule 1.8 (b) states "A lawyer shall not use information relating to the representation 
of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after 
consultation. 
16. Rule 1.9 states "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter: (a) represent another person in the same or substantial factually related 
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the 
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or ...". The next 
part qualifies how a lawyer can use information if it becomes commonly known as 
Judge Hilder was trying to show how the information Steve was told about Allen 
didn't apply because the information had become known. For the record 1.9 (a) still 
does not give the lawyer the right to represent another person adverse to his previous 
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clients interest even if information becomes known. Also Petitioner told his wife 
Julie about the information, but per rule 502 or the Utah Rules of Evidence, he had a 
right to try and maintain that information as privileged. Petitioner and Steve both had 
no right to tell Mrs. Packer about it, yet confidential information is used against 
Respondent all the time by the Packers in their court cases. 
17. Rule 1.16 states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has 
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if; (a)(1) the 
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other 
law". 
18. Finally if all this is not enough to get Steve dismissed look at rule 4.3 which states 
"(a) During the course of a lawyers representation of a client, the lawyer shall not 
give advice to an unrepresentative person other then the advice to obtain council, (b) 
in dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by council, a 
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresentative person misunderstands 
the lawyers role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding." If as the court seems to want to conclude, that there wasn't a 
Client relationship established, then Steve clearly violated an imperative in Rule 4.3 
in which he had an inappropriate conversation with an unrepresented person, in the 
which he did a number of things with Respondent that he shouldn't have based upon 
his contention that Respondent was not represented by counsel. For this reason alone 
Steve should be disqualified. 
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19. Finally one of the real difficulties of this case is that when ever anyone want to do 
something that is clearly discriminatory in a divorce, thcv usually use "protection of 
the children" as an excuse for their actions. In this case Respondent has part of the 
children so the arguments that the discrimination is to protect the children fly in the 
face of reason. Anything which hurts Respondent also hurts the children, specifically 
Robert and Christopher who live with him. 
20. For the reasons stated above Respondent respectfully requests that: 1. Court 
reconsider Respondents motions with regard to child support issues, as not addressing 
them is in violation of Federal Law and Constitutionally protected rights, and 2; Court 
reconsider Respondents request to have Michelle dismissed as her continued presence 
guarantees that Respondent will not have a fair trial and the children will suffer for 
this, and 3; Court should reconsider the request to have Steve Wall dismissed. 
Delaying these motions will not bring a speedy and fair resolution to this case, but 
only guarantees that the fighting and legal battles will live on in Supreme Court and 
Appellate Court Appeals, and possibly into the Federal Courts. These motions are 
clearly in the interest of Justice and the best interest of the minor children. 
21. Respondent reminds the court that Article VI of the Constitution states "This 
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof.... Shall be the Supreme Law of the Land: and all State Judges shall be bound 
thereby'1. 
Respectfully Submitted This /^-Day of J * ^ 2 0 0 ^ 
Respondent (Pro Se) 
10 
32 
